«БРАТЬЯ-МУСУЛЬМАНЕ» В ЕВРОПЕ: ИДЕОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ И ОРГАНИЗАЦИОННАЯ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ

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Политический ислам становится важнейшим фактором международного взаимодействия на современном этапе. В начале XXI в. деятельность исламистских организаций стала предметом беспокойства не только на Ближнем Востоке, но и в странах Западной Европы, а также США. Данное обстоятельство обостряет тот факт, что в силу своего колониального прошлого Европа, где удельный вес мусульманского населения растет год от года, стала своеобразным источником распространения ислама. Более того, после событий «арабской весны» 2011 г. здесь развернулся еще более жесткий миграционный кризис, который поставил Европу перед проблемой соблюдения принципа религиозной свободы местных мусульман, с одной стороны, и сохранения европейских ценностей светской демократии – с другой. Ассоциация «Братья-муслимане» на протяжении практически всей своей истории считается основной исламистской силой не только в арабском мире, но и в странах Запада. И если на Ближнем Востоке она позиционирует себя скорее как просто политическую организацию, пусть и имеющую широкое представительство, то в Европе ассоциация «Братья-муслимане» фактически объявила себя выразителем интересов всей местной исламской уммы.

Учитывая увеличение количества мусульман в данном регионе, европейское общество не может не волновать так называемая исламская экспансия. В данных обстоятельствах вопрос о том, действительно ли данный процесс имеет место и какую роль в нем играет европейская ветвь ассоциации «Братья-муслимане», выходит на передний план. Автором предпринимается попытка ответить на него путем анализа различных этапов идеологической трансформации ассоциации «Братья-муслимане» и ее деятельности в Европе. Делается вывод о том, что важной в этом процессе оказалась идейная эволюция, пройденная материнской организацией «Братья-муслимане» в Египте. Как сама ассоциация прошла путь от военизированной группировки с антисионистским дискурсом до умеренного демократически


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Political Islam has become an important factor of the international politics nowadays. By the beginning of the 21st century Islamist political groups have turned to be a matter of concern not only of the Middle East main stakeholders, but also the European and American ones. This circumstance has been aggravated even more, considering the fact, that, being a former metropolis, Europe had come to be a kind of cradle for the spread of Islam. The proportion of the Islamic population has been growing here year by year. Moreover, the migration waves following the 2011 Arab spring provoked even more tough migration crisis and posed a complicated challenge to the European society expressed in conciliation of freedom of religion within its Muslim community along with the preserving European values of secular democracy. The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood has always been considered to be a leading Islamist force not only in Arabic world but in the West as well. Indeed, if in the Middle East they position themselves rather as a political force, even though with wide representation, in Europe the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood claims to be a representative of the Muslim population of the region as a whole. Taking into account the growing Islamic presence in the continent, a certain anxiety in the European society cannot but exist, concerning the risk of conscious Islamic expansion. In this circumstances the question, whether this process is...
really taking place as well as which role the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood plays in it, came to the fore. This article tries to answer this question, analysing the different stages of the group’s ideological transformation and its influence on the group’s activity in Europe. The author comes to the conclusion, that being a movement, that has undergone substantial ideological transformation, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood has followed a similar scenario in Europe. Since the organisation itself has made a long way from a militant organisation with anti-Western discourse to a moderate movement, claiming to be democratically oriented and tolerant to the West, their European branch has transformed from a small Islamist group in temporary exile in the enemy camp, to the organisation, considering itself a representative of the European Muslim community, as well as accepting Europe as a motherland.

**Keywords:** Islam in Europe; the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood; political Islam; ideological transformation; European Muslim community; European Muslims; Federation of Islamic Organisation in Europe.

Since political Islam has acquired a stronger position on the geopolitical stage, the issue of a so-called Muslim expansion across Europe has become one of the subjects of paramount relevance under the scrutiny of analysts and politicians.

Feed by the migration waves following the 2011 Arab spring, the refugee crisis occurred with the growing number of Muslim migrants seeking to pose challenges to European societies as such, in terms of conciliation of freedom of religion along with the preserving European values of secular democracy.

Islamic organisations have always played a crucial role in protecting the rights of Muslims in Europe, providing them with organisational and legal support as well as allocating funding to build appropriate religious infrastructures. Positioning itself as the largest and the most influential Islamist group in the region of the Middle East and the North Africa, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (the MB) or Ikwan, as it’s called in Arab world developed its activities in Europe. Its active work tends to give possibility to associate the MB with mentioned Muslim expansion and represent the group as one of its tools. Thus, the question if the MB really has goals of cultural, religious, or even political expansion in the European area, has been becoming very relevant nowadays.

The problem of the MB presence in Europe has been investigated by the range of scholars. Samir Amghar from the Catholic University of Lyon is a recognised researcher of political Islam in alien sociocultural environment. He published a range of studies in Arabic, English and French dedicated to the European MB’s activity, one of them is «Al-iḥwān al-muṣlimīn fi al-Uruba. Dirasat tahlīliyya li tanzim islāmi» («Muslim Brotherhood in Europe»). Analysis of the Islamic organisation examines the specificity of the MB branch in European countries, mostly in France, giving the detailed description of the group’s modes of action as well as its infrastructure and the most outstanding representatives [1]. The other marked investigator of the issue is Brigitte Maréchal from the Catholic University of Louvain predominantly considers sociological facet of the MB presence in Europe, focusing on the activity of the Belgian branch [2].

The deep research of the development of the MB activity in Europe is impossible without tracing its ideological evolution as well as the plot of the politics of the motherhood Egyptian organisation which can be observed in the works of the group’s creator and main ideologist Hasan al-Banna. His most famous book «Majmu‘at al-rasa‘il imam ash-shahid Hasan al-Banna» («Collection of messages of imam Hasan al-Banna») covers his points of view concerning all range of economic, political, social and cultural problems of Arabic world and the ways to solve them [3]. Along with it, the detailed overview of the MB’s ideas and the ways of their implementation are reviewed in the studies of the most famous Russian, Western and Egyptian scholars such as M. Razhbadinov, Khalil al-Anani, A. Pargeter, B. Rubin and B. Rutherford, who have been examining the political aspect of the group’s practice.

Apparently, in spite of the existence of certain works on the MB activity in Europe, all of them has been considering the issue from the political and sociological point of view, while there is no any investigation, tracing the historical process of the MB’s ideological and organisational transformation and its impact on the activity of the European branch and its possibility to realise any kind of expansion there. Addressing this issue implies to consider the ideology of the society itself, its practice as a political group in home countries before examining how it is being practically articulated with its activities in Europe, using such methods of the historical investigation as historical-genetic and historical-comparative. Thus, two different dimensions should be thoroughly scrutinised. They are ideological and political ones.

As for ideological aspects, the intellectual and ideological roots of the MB traces back to their founder Hasan al-Banna, who created them in 1928 as a cultural and religious group designed to resist Western influence, in a context of foreign domination: despite the window dressing of nominal independence gained in 1922, the Kingdom of Egypt remained still under the political yoke of the United Kingdom, which maintained strict control over domestic affairs, based on the provisions of the treaty of 1936, which allowed them to maintain troops, whose non-official mandate went far beyond the protection of the Suez Canal and the training of the nascent national Egyptian army. It could be said that at that time Egypt was deprived of any organisation in the position to embody or to revive an Egyptian identity. Benefiting from this vacuum, the MB sought to position themselves as a driving force of the national liberation movement.
Contrary to the approach developed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who forged national identity as a core conceptual basis nurturing his pan-Arab aspirations, Hassan al-Banna deemed the card of religious identity more appropriate to achieve independence, recalling the failures of the Wafd administration, which had solely been playing the national card.

Inspired by famous pan-Islamists of the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century Jamalaladdin al-Afgani, Mohammed Abdo and Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Banna developed the concept of the superiority of Islamic civilization over all others, denying that Egypt needed cultural or any other support from the West [3, p. 252]. In his view, the West was logically considered as a rival and getting rid of «Western cultural and political expansion, debauchery and materialism» was set as one of the most important goal of the MB [3, p. 217]. Moreover, Hassan al-Banna emphasised his rejection of the expansionist policies of the Western powers and spoke out about the Egyptians’ complete readiness to fight the colonialists, having stated the following: «Today Hitler wants to bring people a new order. Churchill says that if Britain wins, it will also establish a new order in the world. Roosevelt predicts his order. They all say that they seek to ensure peace and security in Europe. What such an order is preparing for the East and Muslims? We want to tell Western politicians that if in the past the idea of colonialism has already failed once, then in future it will be even more grandiose failures» [3, p. 217].

It is clear that the West was seen as an enemy, having encroached on the independence of the Islamic world, corrupted the minds of people and lead them astray from the true, righteous path. So, at the early stage of its formation, the MB was more focused on a seclusion-scheme to protect Islam from the West, far from expansion plans. Its main aim was the transformation of Egyptian society towards wider islamisation in order to withstand foreign values. As an ideological basis of the necessity of such islamisation Hassan al-Banna adopted the concept of the comprehensiveness of Islam. The key idea of his doctrine stated that Islam was an overwhelming system providing for the strategic areas of a state life, ranging from economics, throughout public administration to social activity, needless to say about cultural one [4, p. 573]. Pure religiosity was believed to be useless for Islamic society [5, p. 167].

Such a pattern was considered to be ideal and universal, thereby Muslim world should have taken it as an economic, political, social and cultural model in order to overcome the overwhelming crisis, in which it was embedded. Moreover, according to Hassan al-Banna, all the Muslims should have been united in one Islamic state, regardless their nationality [3, p. 27]. As an ideal example of the state system Hassan al-Banna presented the medieval Islamic Caliphate, namely, the period of the righteous caliphs of the 18th–19th centuries. Salafists had already turned as the gold standard of government [6, p. 116]. According to the MB founder, «the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood is addressed to all the faithful people and does not divide them into different groups. The one Islamic Caliphate and its revival is the main goal of the Brotherhood» [3, p. 27].

The creation of the Islamic Caliphate as a single homeland for all Muslims implied serious preparation, including profound transformation of the society. Hassan al-Banna himself was the herald of gradual changes, step by step moving from a unified state, before embracing the whole Muslim area. The way that he proposed for the creation of such a state could be characterised as insensible or gradual penetration of the MB ideology (i. e. Islamic ideology) in all the areas of the life of the state. It meant, that they should have gradually disseminated its discourse throughout Egypt, changing its society on the grass-roots level, slowly moving towards the transformation all over their Arab homeland.

It can be seen that the classical ideology of the MB was mainly focused on local issues of each country in the area of internal politics and confrontation to the West in the field of foreign politics.

The idea of a global caliphate, supported by the MB main ideologist implied integration of as many countries as possible, including Western ones, so it may seem that the group had global goals. But the MB has always understood that the caliphate was doomed to remain an utopia and designed it an ideal-type model. Their main aim from the very beginning of their existence was the religious and cultural independence from the West, as well as preserving their own identity; they have always been pretty pragmatic and focused more on the existing problems rather than idealistic concepts. So, it comes out, that in the first, ideological dimension, the MB doesn’t have and has never had any ambitions of foreign or world expansion.

The second, political, dimension of the problem of so-called Muslim expansion reveals the plasticity of the MB, as a very experienced, flexible and pragmatic religious and political group. The MB went through the organisational and ideological transformation inherent to any political movement. It has evolved significantly during its existence in the Arabic world along with its political and historical environment. As the MB is a highly centralised organisation with strict submission to its head office in Cairo, such transformations strongly affected its activity in Europe as well.

The first important milestone towards the transformation of the MB discourse and political practice after the period of its creation and initial activity was identified in the 1950–60s, when the group had to go underground due to the tough repressions of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. The reason for such a hostile attitude was simple and commonplace: the MB loss of power struggle. The MB leadership along with

1Hereinafter translated by A. K.
free officers took a significant part in the overthrow of Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and hoped that their efforts would be appreciated, having counted on several seats in government. These hopes were supported by the first president of Egypt general Mohamed Nagib. But Gamal Abdel Nasser didn’t have wish to share power with anyone, having got rid first of Mohamed Nagib, organizing his oust followed by house arrest, then the MB, having brought down repression on them [7, p. 166–170]. The formal reason for the persecution of the MB was the attempted murder of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, performed by one of the MB members. Yet, this attempt (even taking for granted that it was not a provocation from the Egyptian regime) was made after the ideological and political conflict between Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ikwan and should have been considered rather as a pretext to intensify repression against the MB, than a real reason for their persecution.

Another component of this sharp confrontation was in the ideological dimension. Indeed, MB supported Islamism and strongly advocated for the creation of an Islamic state based on religious identity, whereas Gamal Abdel Nasser epitomised a secular-based Arab nationalism. Endowing the MB with the aspired authority in the government would have meant that these ideological feuds would have turned into political ones, implying an institutionalised power struggle with possible victory of the MB. Gamal Abdel Nasser had been wise enough to understand this and delivered a preemptive strike. As a result, most of the leaders of the organisation and many of its members were imprisoned and executed, and the group itself was outlawed in 1954. This period marked a certain radicalisation of the MB’s ideology, the emergence of Said Qutb’s militant concept of Jihad and even more aggressive than before attitude to the West [8].

This stage of the MB development refers to the first and the largest flow of migrants, political prisoners linked to the MB, that took place in the end of the 1950s – the first half of the 1960s [2, p. 36]. In order to escape tough repressions, those, who possessed some assets, moved abroad, to Khalij countries (e.g., Qatar, having been British protectorate that time hostile to Gamal Abdel Nasser), or to Europe. One of the most prominent MB leaders, fled Egypt in these circumstances, was Said Ramadan, who had moved first to Saudi Arabia, then to Switzerland, where he found Islamic Centre in Geneva in 1960. Less famous, but no less outstanding refugee of that period was Youssuf Nada, who had come to Austria in the late 1950s, where he set up the local branch of the MB [9, p. 19]. This migration flow laid the foundation for the development of the MB network in Europe, due to financial and political potential of its members.

A very eloquent fact in this aspect is that mentioned European countries didn’t only impede the penetration of Islamists, but also willingly accepted them. There were three main reasons for such hospitality. The first one was pure political. Egyptian foreign politics togethet with socialist discourse of its leadership distanced from the West in the aftermath of the 1956 war and carried out a strategic rapprochement with the USSR. Therefore, taking in refugees from a rival was considered by the West as a part of geopolitical struggle.

The second reason was related to the ideological sphere: having positioned itself as the palladium of democratic values, Europe could not refuse asylum to the victims of dictatorship. Hence, «the West’s freedoms allowed the Brothers to openly conduct the activities for which they had been persecuted in their home countries» [9, p. 7].

The third reason lied in geopolitical terms. In the 1950s – the beginning of 1960s the colonial system decay reached its climax. The welcoming of migrants from former control zones could be considered as a restoration of colonial dignity and suitable generis attempt to preserve international influence.

The activity of the MB in Europe that time reflected the stage of their ideological and political development as well as organisational development. Due to the fact, that the MB migration was the part of political battle in their home country, a vast majority of initial representatives of the MB who were migrants were represented by outstanding activists (for example, already mentioned Said Ramadan, Hassan al-Banna’s son-in-law and one of the most remarkable leaders of the MB). This circumstance determined the specificity of their early activity in Europe: they perceived it as a temporary exile and were striving to come back home after the ousting of hostile regimes [1, p. 14], having compared this experience with the experience of the prophet Muhammad, who had been forced to move from Mecca to Medina in 622 [10, p. 238]. Political changing in Arabic world remained their main priority, so they attempted to participate in the political process in their countries from abroad [1, p. 14].

As it has been already mentioned, the MB rhetoric was pretty anti-western that time, so, the members of the group were actually forced to live in the camp of the enemy. Anyway, while their setting in Europe they had to practice their religion and needed a certain infrastructure, mainly places of worship, that Europe dramatically lacked. They started to create this infrastructure, which was actually necessary for all the Muslims: mosques, Islamic schools, cultural centres [9, p. 7]. One of the examples of it was Islamic Centre in Munich, launched in 1960 by Said Ramadan [10, p. 245]. By this way the MB aimed to resist Western influence, preserving their cultural and religious identity, exactly as they had done in Egypt before, in Hassan al-Banna times. The difference between these two situations was that now the group had to fulfil its activity on foreign territory in an alien environment and initially didn’t have any aims to widely disseminate its ideology, the members of the MB were solving their own religious issues while their temporary (as they used to hope that time) stay abroad.
But the specifics of the MB ideology, as well as its practice was such, that even without clearly articulated goal of this kind its discourse started to spread, primarily through the infrastructure it had created. By this way the MB made connections with other Muslim population and were gradually winning it over on their side. In the end it was the MB, which gave European Muslims opportunity to practice their religion without obstacles and provided them with all facilities necessary for this, having become an actual link between European Muslims and their national and religious identity. Having formed a peculiar Islamic community, MB supported all the Muslims, turned up in an alien neighbourhood and lost in Christian, or even atheistic European surrounding, having sought to preserve their cultural and religious identity. Such preservation can be defined as the main goal of the MB activity in Europe in the 1960s.

The MB with their experience of individual preaching and canvassing in Egypt, had an extensive grip of the psychological mechanisms, knowing what Muslims needed to hear from them in order to win over. By this way the MB started to expand their influence and become more and more popular among European Muslim communities, gaining popularity even among those, who had not supported them in their home countries before [9, p. 7].

Thus, just as the Egyptian MB became the mother­ship of all the other MB branches in Arab countries, it laid the foundations for the development of political Islam in Europe, spreading its influence here and gaining new members. At the same time, the subsequent waves of migration of the MB from other countries of Arab world additionally contributed to the spread of an Islamic narrative here, stemming from Hassan al-Banna's concept of gradual penetration.

The second stream of the MB migration to Europe falls on the middle of the 1960s and was from Syria. Al-Ba'ath party, that came here to power in 1963, consisted of the representatives of Alavite religious minority, Shiite sect, having been considered by the MB as kufara’ what means non-believers. The other important ideological reason, having put these two parties into confrontation, was the extreme secularism of al-Ba'ath. Al-Ba’ath, as well as Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser was a supporter of secular nationalism as a political dominant in Syria, and perceived Islam exclusively in the cultural plane, unlike the MB. For sure, there was a political competition along with the ideological and religious ones: the MB was struggling for power itself and considered al-Ba’ath as a political rival.

The MB sharply opposed the ruling party, driven by the slogan of «restoring power to the Sunni majority» and took part in 1964 revolt against al-Ba’ath, brutally crushed by authorities. The most active MB members having participated in the revolt, were jailed, and the open confrontation between leading secular and Islamic political forces began. The same year the leader of the organisation, Isam al-Attar, was not allowed into the country after his pilgrimage to Mecca. He first moved to Lebanon, and later settled in Germany [11, p. 168], having marked the beginning of the migration of Syrian MB to Europe. He stayed in Aachen, where in 1968 he began to publish the al-Ra’d magazine and tried to manage Syrian MB from there [11, p. 173].

By this way, the MB migrants from Syria joined the ranks of Islamic activists, having formed a peculiar centre in Aachen, in addition to already existing in Munich, had been constituted by Egyptians before.

This migration flow coincided with the new stage of the MB ideological transformation, associated with the official transition of the society to moderation and a complete renunciation of violence in 1970s. The new president of Egypt Anwar Sadat headed for the rehabilitation of the Islamists, having sought to use them as a counterweight to the nasserists [7, p. 245]. In 1971, during the general amnesty, most members of the MB were released from prison.

In addition, in an effort to weaken the left movement, Anwar Sadat encouraged the activities within campuses and student unions, where the MB was rapidly gaining popularity. Thus, in 1977, the MB already controlled the student unions of all 15 universities in Egypt, and in 1978 it won control of the National Egyptian Student Union [12, p. 116]. In this way ideological transformation to moderation promoted the MB political activity on the state level from one side, and contributed to growing popularity of the MB among general population from the other side.

After the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the new president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, continued his predecessor's course of interaction with moderate Islamists. Resorting to their help, he sought to weaken the radical Islamist groups that intensified their activity in the early 1980s. The MB supported the leader of Egypt in this confrontation, and their supreme guide Umar al-Tilimsani had repeatedly stated that all Egyptians should support the government in the fight against extremists [4, p. 4]. The loyalty of the authorities allowed the group to expand its sphere of influence even more, enjoying a privileged position in student unions and extending its activities to professional associations. In 1984 the MB began to infiltrate and control the medical syndicate, in 1986 the trade union of engineers, and in 1988 the labour association of pharmacists [13, p. 44].

The MB used the trade unions as a springboard to politics: in 1984 they participated in the parliamentary elections, at the end of which they gained 58 places in parliament (as far as they had been banned legislatively, they had to run for election as a part of other parties, or as independent candidates) [7, p. 301]. By this way, the group’s transition to the official politics in general and their participation in electoral process made them
become more flexible, opened to different attitude and cooperative. This beginning of the open activity of the MB along with its turn towards moderation coincided with the revitalisation of the Islamist political groups in Turkey, which prompted a third wave of the Islamist migration to Europe. It was related to the MB-associated Turkish organisation Milli Gorus and traces back to the middle of the 1970s. As well as in Egypt and Syria before, in Turkey the confrontation between Islamist and secular political forces was the main reason of Islamist migration.

Necmettin Erbakan joined the political party of national order in 1970, though it was soon banned by secular Turkish government. As a result, he had to move to Germany for some time, where in 1975 party branch Milli Gorus was formed, and subsequently Necmettin Erbakan’s visits to Europe became frequent [14, p. 324].

Mentioned period of 1970–80s marked an important stage for the MB development in Europe. First, due to the new waves of migration a certain organisational transformation occurred, expressed in the formation of several branches. If in the 1960s the Egyptian MB represented the only one centre of Islamic thought in Europe, the 1970s brought there the representatives of Syria and Turkey, having preserved reverence to Egyptian headquarters from one side, but acted autonomously from the other, having formed different centres of activity.

Second, as the MB mother organisation in Egypt had already transformed ideologically and politically by this period, having moved from underground activity to a full-fledged open air, its engagement in Europe became more active as well. As the majority of the MB activists that time were the representatives of intelligentsia and students [9, p. 7], it was logical that the MB began to carry out their activity at university level, having attracted sympathisers among Muslim students not only from Egypt, but also from the other countries of the Middle East. Then, following the «gradual penetration» model that had been already applied in Egypt before, they began to spread their areas of activity, developing the elements of their own spread of influence: youth and women branches of the MB, think tanks, etc. So, if in the 1960s the spread of their discourse was rather a side effect, than a framed goal, in the 1970–80s it became a deliberate priority, manifested in the formation of the Islamic organisations at the interstate level and positioning the group as the representative of all the European Muslim community. For example, in 1976 the Islamic council of Europe was created «as the highest coordination body of Muslim organisations in Europe, representing the interests of 25 million Muslims» [10, p. 241]. Said Ramadan joined its executive committee. One more case of organisational formation of the Muslim community was represented by the launching of the Islamic Centre in Aachen in 1978, responsible for the building of the Belal Mosque in this city [10, p. 245].

The next important phase of the MB ideological and political transformation extends over the late 1990–2000s. In 1995, the MB formalised an ideological and political transition corpus named the Statement on Democracy, which announced their adhesion to democratic principles. During the Egyptian parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2005, the MB drew up a programme, based on democratic principles of freedom of speech, human rights, free and fair elections, market economy, etc. At the same time, such a transition to democracy did not abolish the Islamic ideological foundation of the group: Islam still was proclaimed as an official religion of Egypt as well as Sharia as a main source of legislation. The MB has developed their political narrative in accordance with the need of the times and society, leaving orthodox religiosity to the past, and focused their discourse on the necessity to improve living standards and work on economic issues. Thus, by participating in parliamentary and municipal council elections, the MB was lead to compromise with the government and political factions, and moulded several tactics, having forced it to consensus with the government and other political movements [15, p. 35].

This transformation was clearly seen during the parliamentary and presidential elections following the 2011 Egyptian revolution, won both by the MB in 2012. The program of the MB Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), as well as Mohammad Morsi, their representative in the presidential competition, was consistent with the values and ideals of the Egyptian revolution of 2011, declaring commitment to democracy, the independence of the judiciary, the principle of separation of powers and social welfare of the population [15, p. 90]. The first FJP advertisement shown on television in the spring of 2011 was titled «We love all colours». Thus, according to one of the leading members of the MB, Abdel Hafez, the party sought to show respect for the diversity of political trends, religions and nationalities represented in the country.

It came out, that the transformation of the discourse definitely made the MB successful on the political arena and brought it to power, before being overthrown during the second revolution of 2013. The MB undertook a comprehensive ideological and political transformation leading to a new paradigm, binding Islamic ideology interpretation and democratic principles. Moreover it is seen, that the way it has carried out its activity has varied from time to time and fully depended on the external environment, switching easily from open air politics during thaw times to underground actions in time of repressions. Over its history, the MB has always demonstrated remarkable flexibility.

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and adaptability to any cultural, social, economic or political conditions.

A certain change the group has undergone in its perception of the West as well. Obviously, their basic rationale of presenting the West as an ideological rival and enemy lost its relevance in conditions of highly globalised world and the group’s commitment to democracy. As main opposition force in early 2000s, the MB tried to establish contacts with Egypt’s main economic and political partner, the United States, in an effort to present itself as a possible alternative to power and to demonstrate flexibility and the ability to compromise [15, p. 43–44]. Practically it was expressed in the series of meetings between the MB leadership and the US high officials and actual political recognition of the group by American administration.

Noting the importance of political cooperation with the West, the MB remained critical to its values and perception of democracy, having admitted that «Europe represents a democratic model that is inherent in precisely European society, but is not suitable for Arab countries» [6, p. 70] or «Muslim Brotherhood believes that Muslim society can follow the same democratic traditions and processes used in the West, but at the same time, while maintaining Islamic principles in morality and ethics» [16, p. 222]. Thus, the MB distinguished the concept of democracy as a system of values and democracy as a political tool. They supported the latter, but many of the democratic values, preached by the West, remained alien to the association. Anyway, though still Western democratic values remained alien to the MB, their contemporary discourse had estranged from the initial hostility.

In the wake of this transformation period the fourth flow of the MB migration departed from Tunisia and occurred in the end of the 1980s – the beginning of the 1990s. Due to its historical links with France and its strong colonial heritage Tunisia has always been one of the most secular countries in the region. In 1972 the MB established a local faction under the name of al-Nahda («Revival»). Habib Burgiba, Tunisian leader between 1957 and 1987, didn’t pay much attention to it, focusing his political activity on the struggle with the leftists [17, p. 151]. In these conditions, Islamists gradually gained political influence and became the most dangerous rivals to the regime.

But the open confrontation between Islamists and secular government unfolded after medical coup arranged by Zinedine Ben Ali to supersede an ailing Habib Burgiba in 1987. Unlike Habib Burgiba he was perfectly aware of political weight of the MB and started the opposition of the group, having perceived it as a political threat. First, in 1988, after all the religiously based political movements had been banned legislatively, the MB became illegal and some of its prominent figures were forced to leave the country (e. g. their leader Rashid al-Gannushi moved to the USA), then, in 1991, the whole structure was totally dismantled with more than 500 members arrested [17, p. 160]. The hostility of the regime became the reason why a lot of members preferred migration to the francophone part of Europe (mainly France and Belgium), where they laid the foundation of the western wing of the Tunisian MB, which called al-Nahda fi al-Kharij [18, p. 523].

The period of the 1990s, as the stage of transition to democratic ideology, was marked by two important trends in the activity of the MB in Europe.

The first one is the MB concentration imprecisely on the European direction. The MB finally left hope for any reviving of activity in their home countries under the grip of secular authoritarian rulers. Furthermore, the staff composition of the MB has significantly evolved over time. Even if the old guard kept the key positions, the MB recruited more and more Muslims, born in European countries and held European citizenship. Those new members were much more concerned about their way of life in an alien cultural-religious environment and the protection of their own religious rights and freedoms, than the political battle in Arab countries.

The amendments to the agenda were a prerequisite for the survival of the group’s influence in Europe. As a result of it, an ideological schism occurred in the early 1990s, when one part of activists decided to concentrate their activities in European direction instead of interfering in Arab politics and the organisation’s leadership. This ended with the decision made by the MB mother structure in Egypt: each branch should operate according to the local context [1, p. 15].

This alteration of course made the MB activity more on-site. At the same time, its sway over local Muslims became much wider, as from this time the group started to position itself as the main representative of the Islamic minority in Europe, and this is the second important trend of the 1990s. This transition was formalised already in 1989, a little before the official decision of the MB headquarters about the changing of its agenda, and was expressed in the formation of the Federation of Islamic Organisation in Europe (FIOE). The objectives, claimed by this organisation, were focused on the promotion of the Islamic religion and culture, the building of infrastructure, i. e. mosques, schools, cultural centres, etc, as well as the representation of Muslims on the European level. Moreover, there were such objectives mentioned in its official testimony, published on the website of FIOE, as «working towards achieving representation of Muslims within European institutions and authorities» and «striving towards achieving recognition for Islam as an official religion throughout Europe».

The mentioned objectives clearly indicate, that the MB started to consider Muslim minority in Europe as an inevitable part of European society, as well as Europe as home and not a temporary shelter for refugees like

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5Our objectives [Electronic resource]. URL: https://euromuslims.org/en/objectives/ (date of access: 01.08.2020).
before. This lead the MB to carve out the new identity of European Muslim, not fully assimilated but abiding by the rules and laws of the country he lives in while preserving his religious identity. This orientation was reflected in the decisions of the officials of the group as well. For example, in France, during the 5th national conference of imams in March 2008, the procedure of secular marriage was legitimised within the framework of Islam [10, p. 248]. This action clearly witnesses that the MB started to adapt to cultural and religious environment they live in, again having proved themselves to be a flexible movement ready to act and transform its discourse according to the conditions in the field.

Such flexibility is expressed in the willingness to collaborate with state authorities as well and the acceptance of this fact by the latter. The summary of the British Government Review of the MB published in 2015 stated that «the Muslim Brotherhood has not been linked to terrorist related activity in and against the UK. The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK has often condemned terrorist related activity in the UK associated with al-Qa’ida... The Muslim Brotherhood has been publicly committed to political engagement in this country. Engagement with government has at times been facilitated by what appeared to be a common agenda against al-Qaida and (at least in the UK) militant salafism. But this engagement did not take account of Muslim Brotherhood support for a proscribed terrorist group and its views about terrorism which, in reality, were quite different from our own». In this way, it can be seen, that the MB started to pose itself as the organisation (representative of Muslims within European society, rather than an organisation) ideological rival of the West. Again such kind of transformation was connected not only with the reform within the European MB itself, but with the ideological and political changing of the MB on the whole.

In these circumstances, could the West be considered as a possible area of expansion? The most likely answer is no. First, it is clearly seen from the political practice of the MB – throughout their existence they have been concentrated on the political competition within their countries of origin, applying Hassan al-Banna’s concept of gradual penetration, disseminating their discourse throughout various institutions on a step by step approach. Second, having developed mechanisms of survival during the numerous periods of repression it went through, the MB is a highly pragmatic and realistic political group and never puts the goals it feels not able to fulfil. Therefore, at this stage, the objective of expansion in the secular West seems to be too ambitious for an Islamist organisation.

Thus, summing up all of the above, the European MB has been changing ideologically, politically and institutionally in conformity with the inner transformation of the mother organisation in Egypt. Hence, the current activity of the group in Europe is carried out according to the tasks that it faces in an alien sociocultural environment. Thus, the main objectives of the European MB nowadays may be stated as follows:

1. Preservation of the cultural and religious identity of the Islamic ummah in Europe. In terms of functioning under the prevalence of a Christian or atheistic culture, as a religious minority, the most important thing that the MB strives for is simply not to be assimilated by Europeans and not to forget the Muslim background.

2. The spread of its socio-political influence on the European Muslim community as a whole and, consequently, self-positioning as a representative of the interests of all European Muslims. Such ambitions are not groundless, given that many Islamic organisations operating in Europe, including the leading ones, were established by the MB or have connections with them (for example, already mentioned here Islamic Council of Europe, Islamic Centre in Aachen, Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe). All these organisations are official representatives of Muslim communities at both state and European levels and in fact express the position of European Muslims. Thus, it can be affirmed that the official position of the European Islamic community is largely inspired by the MB, in spite of the fact, that formally, none of the above organisations is related to the MB infrastructure. However, this fits well with the organisational framework of the group. As acknowledged by Mahdi Akef himself, the MB supreme guide in 2004–2010, the MB are not a «strictly formed organisation with membership card and party fees. Anyone who sympathises with the Brothers may be considered a member of them» [9, p. 9]. Such a flexible structure was originally conceived for functioning in conditions of illegal activities in Egypt, but it also took root well in Europe, where the MB, as well as other Islamic organisations, are wary and it’s easier to function unofficially.

3. In spite of the fact, that there is no question about any serious ambitions for Islamic expansion or the serious spread of its ideology, the MB nevertheless deems Europe as a platform for preaching. The concept of dar al-dawah (house of preaching) was developed specifically for the MB living outside the Muslim homeland (in addition to dar of al-Islam (house of Islam) and dar al-harb (house of war) introduced by Seyyid Qutb) [9, p. 7]. Dar al-Dawah means a place where Muslims are in the minority, which means that the spread of Islamic discourse is especially important.

In this circumstances it is worth noting, that while the main reason of the migration of the MB members to Europe was political persecution in their home countries, it became a part of the ideological confrontation between Islamism and secular nationalism, having represented a political dominant in the countries of the Middle East and the North Africa after they had gained

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independence. Remarkably, the secular political trend has demonstrated its extreme authoritarianism, having removed any sameness between secularism and democracy. In these circumstances Islamists had to seek for democracy abroad in order to have possibility to fulfil their activity, and consequently started their public support for a democratic form of government in general. Paradoxically, European secular state model became more favourable to their activity, then Arabic one. Moreover, by this way Islamists started to be associated with democracy as they were fighting with dictatorship in Arabic countries, even though in fact this fight was rather against secularism than for democracy itself.

As a result it can be stated, that being a movement, that has undergone substantial ideological transformation, the MB has followed a similar scenario in Europe. The difference between the activity in these two geographical areas that, unlike in Arab world, the MB has never had opportunity to claim the political dominance due to less quantity of Muslims there along with the fact, that a significant part of European Muslims has been integrated and assimilated and far from religious rhetoric of the society. At the same time, the MB has adapted to the European reality and realised their activity in the framework of the socio-political situation they faced there. However, the European MB has been demonstrating their full allegiance to Hassan al-Banna concept of insensible penetration, had been implemented in Egypt before, but adjusted for the Western reality of alien sociocultural environment. It means, that even in the absence of any ambition of real expansion the MB has tried to take all the chance to increase its influence. All its activity in Europe demonstrates this trend, taking into the account its growing official representation. Anyway, as in Arabic world the MB has gone all the way from a small religious group to a major political movement, in Europe it has transformed from a local community of Muslims in exile to a very organisation, claiming to be the official representative of European Muslims.

Библиографические ссылки

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