

THE TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN OSLO PEACE PROCESS

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Track two diplomacy is designed to deal with conflicts that are deemed to be intractable, because the rational calculation of the antagonists leads to a zero-sum game. Track two diplomacy is non-official, it acts on the perceptions and beliefs and is expected to change the way each actor perceives their strategic interests and threats to their core values. We apply the conceptual frames derived from track two diplomacy theories to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it was a typical case of an intractable conflict transformed with track two diplomacy initiatives. Successful track two diplomacy initiatives were initiated by a third party that socialised the antagonistic elites – i. e. US official and non-official actors, or think tanks. They were combined with track one-and-a-half diplomacy, with an effect on the track one, i. e. the official diplomatic negotiations on peace. Nevertheless, that did not lead to the in-depth transformation on the grassroots level advocated by peace and conflict resolution organisations.

Keywords: track two diplomacy; multitrack diplomacy; track one-and-a-half diplomacy; peace and conflict resolution organisations; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; transfer effect.

ДИПЛОМАТИЯ ВТОРОЙ ЛИНИИ И ЕЕ РОЛЬ В СОДЕЙСТВИИ ПРОЦЕССУ МИРНОГО УРЕГУЛИРОВАНИЯ ИЗРАИЛЬСКО-ПАЛЕСТИНСКОГО КОНФЛИКТА В РАМКАХ СОГЛАШЕНИЙ В ОСЛО

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Дипломатия второй линии может способствовать урегулированию неуправляемых конфликтов, воспринимаемых их участниками, исходящими из рационального расчета, как игра с нулевой суммой. Дипломатия второй линии, являясь неформальной, воздействует на убеждения и интерпретации участников конфликта. Ее цель – влияние на восприятие сторонами своих стратегических интересов и основополагающих ценностей. В свете концепций и теорий дипломатии второй линии рассматривается динамика израильско-палестинского конфликта, представляющего собой типичный пример неуправляемого противостояния, на ход которого удалось повлиять средствами дипломатии второй линии. Делается вывод о том, что наиболее успешные примеры дипломатии второй линии предполагают прямое участие представителей сильной третьей стороны в «ресоциализации» элит враждующих сторон. В израильско-палестинском мирном процессе этой стороной стали Соединенные Штаты Америки. Дипломатия второй линии дополнялась мерами так называемой дипломатии полутретьей линии, что повлияло на ход официальных переговоров в рамках традиционной дипломатии первой линии. Тем не менее предпринятые дипломатические шаги не привели к глубоким трансформациям на низовом уровне, несмотря на усилия неправительственных организаций, специализирующихся в вопросах мирного разрешения конфликтов.

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Ключевые слова: дипломатия второй линии; многоканальная дипломатия; дипломатия полуторной линии; неправительственные организации по содействию миру и мирному разрешению конфликтов; израильско-палестинский конфликт; эффект передачи.

Track two diplomacy in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process

In our former papers on the Israeli–Arab conflict, we considered track two diplomacy in general terms and assessed its potential contribution to the reversal of an ongoing escalation process. In this paper we examine how track two diplomacy could work in a peace process [1]. The concept of two track diplomacy was first proposed by J. Montville and W. Davidson in a paper titled “Diplomacy according to Freud”, three years after the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat made his famous speech at the Israeli Knesset on 20 November 1977. The authors first defined track two diplomacy as “non-official, unstructured interaction. It is always open minded, often altruistic, and in Kelman’s words, strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis” [2, p. 155–156]. Since then non-official activists, many of them former top officials and think tanks have experimented with this version of diplomacy, while political scientists have expanded its conceptual frames and operational approaches to conflict resolution. The Israeli–Arab conflict is distinct by the large number of track two initiatives implemented and the high significance of its resolution for the United States’ foreign policy in the region.

Following the victory over Iraq in 1991, the G. H. W. Bush administration’s bid for American leadership in Middle East revolved around a single dilemma: the need to consolidate its alliance with Israel and strike for hegemony among the Arab countries at the same time. Neither could be achieved successfully while the state of war was prevailing between both sides.

At the core of the conflict was the right of the Palestinian people to the occupied land versus the Israeli

claim for its full sovereignty over the same land. Consequently, the conflict came to be viewed as intractable. Official diplomacy came to a deadlock, and track two diplomacy emerged as an alternative.

Almost three decades after the Oslo declaration of 1993, let us explain how track two diplomacy made possible this short-term diplomatic success, and how it nevertheless failed to bring a lasting solution to the conflict at the end of the transitional period. At issue is not whether track two diplomacy contributed to the peace process, but how it did so, and through what mechanisms.

More specifically, we consider some of the following questions:

1. How did the Israeli–Palestinian conflict move beyond intractability?
2. Was the move towards peace purely utilitarian, or did psychological factors, including beliefs and fears play a role?
3. In what ways could non-official actors and civil society organisations be engaged in the peace and (or) radicalisation process?
4. How can we explicate the role of the United States as a peace broker, and its success in mobilising the resources of multiple non-official actors?

The first three questions are considered by comparing and contrasting various theories and applying them to the relevant empirical cases related to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process before it was deadlocked by the February 2001 election of the Israeli prime minister. The conflict dynamic after that date is discussed briefly, and only with regard to the potential for the exit from the Oslo process.

The intractable Israeli–Arab conflict

When two political actors – or two states – have conflicting claims, a high probability of a zero-sum game arises. In a territorial conflict, when two states claim the same territory, the satisfaction of a claim for one means its denial for the other. Still, the sides may bargain over territorial compromises in a package with something else. Then the probability of a deal is inversely proportional to the value of the disputed land, which in turn depends on the perceptions and beliefs held by each party. In a cost or benefit approach, the land ceded to an antagonist can sometimes be of much less value than the compensation offered for it¹. Nevertheless, the salience of the territorial conflict is

a function of the political pressure on a government from the civil society and grassroots activists against the compromise. Such pressure limits the government’s room for manoeuvre as regards potential compromises. According to B. Walter [3], the greater the relevance of an issue for the civil society, the more the authorities are engaged in a reputation-building policy to win the support of the mainstream and deter the challengers from the margins.

In the protracted Israeli–Arab conflict, the disputed territories have variable salience for the antagonists, as measured, for example by the willingness of the Israeli side to accept a withdrawal. Essentially, Israeli poli-

¹In the case of Sanafir and Tiran islands giving up to the Saudi claim in exchange for a substantial economic support displays the crucial role of the latter for the Egyptian economic recovery. See: The rationale behind Tiran and Sanafir islands deal [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://thearabweekly.com/rationale-behind-tiran-and-sanafir-islands-deal> (date of access: 09.02.2022).

ticians and mainstream opinion never agreed to any compromise on East Jerusalem – seeing it as an integral part of Israel – but were ready to consider abandoning the lands populated by Arabs in the Negev.

Various opinion surveys and official declarations concerning the Syrian and Lebanese occupied territories and suggest that since the mid-1980s, there has been a greater openness to withdrawal from South Lebanon, but not to from the Golan Heights². While both territories were on the map of the Jewish homeland, as defined by the Zionist leaders in the beginning of the 20th century, in South Lebanon, Israel had not had enough time or capability to complete the colonisation-annexation process that would have given this territory the same value as the Golan Heights.

Palestinians and Arabs consider the entire Palestine as their homeland, including the territories occupied in 1948, from which most of the Palestinians were expelled. Therefore, the official position of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Arab governments until the beginning of the Oslo process was to recognise the whole of Palestine as the legitimate Palestinian homeland³.

With the rise of Arab nationalism throughout the 20th century, the Arab populations came to identify themselves with the Palestinian tragedy. Simultaneously, the occupation of the Syrian, Egyptian, and Lebanese territories gave rise to the “Nile to Euphrates narrative” – supported in the media and even main-

stream opinion – claiming that Israel’s ultimate frontiers are these two rivers, and it would pursue such expansion when the geostrategic situation presents this opportunity. As evidence of Israel’s purported plan of territorial expansion, As’ad Razauk [4, p. 521–529] presents S. Isaac’s map, which shows the Israeli frontier extending to the Northern Syrian coast. Therefore, in the Arab perception, all of Palestine was vital, and the solution was the full liberation of the occupied and.

The conflict between Israeli and the Palestinians is considered intractable because both sides lay claim to the same territory which they consider their homeland in its entirety. Elsewhere, however, such seemingly intractable territorial conflicts have been resolved. For example, the conflict between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab coast arose because both sides had strong claims to this territory. For Iraq, it was a strategically important exit to the Persian Gulf, a territory with abundant oil resources and dense oil traffic [5]. The Iraqi statement on sovereignty in the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 solidified this claim by declaring Shatt al-Arab an integral part of the Iraqi and Arab homeland. However Shatt al-Arab was ceded to Iran twice: once under the Algiers accord of 6 March 1975, and the second time by a unilateral decision of the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in August 1990. Both decisions were a part of a deal to secure the withdrawal of Iranian support to the Kurdish rebels in 1975 and guarantee Iran’s neutrality in the Gulf War with the United States.

The Oslo historic compromise: more than a rational calculation

The utilitarian approach derived from the Hobbesian paradigm informs many conflict resolution theories. It presents fundamental interests as objective, visible, standardised, and calculable, and as such, subject to violent rivalry between nations. Many geopolitical approaches to conflict emphasise control over material or political resources and distribution thereof, treating any conflict as being grounded in material or objective claims and interpreting the decision to continue or terminate a conflict as a rational cost or benefit calculation.

The Collier – Hoeffler model [6] identifies two groups of drivers of a civil war: mobilisation of popular frustrations and rational calculation by decision makers. While the former gives the crisis its fuel, the latter is most crucial, because the decision makers will continue the conflict or end it on the basis of a rational calculus.

In a game with two principle protagonists – the political power and the rebels, or the occupier and the occupied – each calculates whether the sharing of the land or resources is more or less advantageous from a cost-benefit perspective. This calculation, of course,

will be influenced by the each side’s assessment of the probability of their victory.

In the Israeli-Arab conflict, the cost benefit calculus has remained favour of the war for decades. Each side has considered a compromise unpalatable to itself and estimated highly its chances of “taking it all” as winners.

On the Arab side, the demands for the return of all the Palestinian people to the occupied territory and the restoration of control for their homeland were not subject to compromise. The alternative was to revert the June 1967 defeat. Some Arab leaders – like Habib Bourguiba – have advocated for the recognition of Israel as undeniable fact and a more realistic approach, but that risked raising a storm in the relations with the rest of the Arab world [7, p. 151–162].

On the Israeli side, Avi Raz [8] pointed to Israeli openness to concluding separate peace deals with the neighbouring Arab states independent of a settlement with the Palestinians. However, Israel has had little readiness to compromise on its boundaries, as the

²The Israel Democracy Institute reported that in 2012, 82 % of Israeli Jews opposed to any restitution of the Golan. See: What do Israelis think about the Golan Heights? [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/26456> (date of access: 09.02.2022).

³In the Palestinian charter of 1974 art. 1–4 define the whole Palestine with its 1918 boundaries as the homeland of the Palestinian, while art. 6 gave the Jews who lived in it until occupation the right to be citizen of this state. See: The Palestinian charter [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.pac-usa.org/the_palestinian_charter.htm (date of access: 09.02.2022).

Israeli claim is based more on a theological-historical narrative than on international law.

Another factor of the intractability was mutual distrust in the circumstances of an intense conflict. In game theory, multiple mathematical models are used for estimating distrust. In Thomas Schelling's model of decision making under mutual distrust [9, p. 207–214], two protagonists, who would otherwise maximise their benefits by making peace, do not act on this possibility because they cannot rule out the prospect of a surprise attack from their opponent. In consequence, each antagonist becomes motivated to escalate the conflict in self-defence.

This defensive approach has prevailed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israel's relations with its neighbours, as Israeli political leaders have been inclined to distrust their Arab counterparts.

In the rational actor paradigm, mutual distrust can often be overcome when a powerful third party engages in "enforced peace brokering", as described by W. Zartman and S. Touva [10]. This changes the cost-benefit calculus for both antagonists by increasing the cost of war.

Geographically, the United States' peace brokering diplomacy has been skewed towards the Middle East, and focused disproportionately on the Israeli-Arab negotiations. At first, the pursuit of separate peace deals between Israel and its Arab neighbours was given first priority, achieving the dual goal of installing peace around Israel and removing the pressure on it for territorial compromises. The Israeli-Egyptian peace process was pulled through because of the incentives from the United States in the form of economic and military aid to the Egyptian government.

The United States' diplomacy of enforced peace brokering, however, was a part of a larger regional strategy to reassert America's hegemony in the Middle East after the Iraq war of 1991. The comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace process had to be its consequence. The United States was putting pressure on Israel to halt

the extension of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, while isolating the PLO for the sake of a new regional order in which the conflict would be addressed.

Simultaneously, the B. Clinton administration emphasised bringing the Arab states to conclude bilateral peace agreements with Israel, especially in the wake of the deadlocked Madrid conference. On the sidelines of this strategy, the PLO received indirect pressure to undertake peace talks with Israel, mainly through incentives for the other states to normalise their relations with Israel [11]. From the rational actor perspective, some of the key pressures for the PLO to engage in the peace process were the new regional environment, the withdrawal of the Gulf's financial support, defeat or isolation of its former allies, and its weakened influence in the West Bank and the Palestinian camps in the neighbouring Arab countries [12, p. 11–29]. Likewise, the ascent of the Labour government in Israel can also be viewed as a rational calculus that took into consideration, *inter alia*, the need to re-legitimize the American-Israeli alliance after the end of the Cold War, winning the domestic battle against the Likud and prospects of a new Middle Eastern order with Israel at its core.

However, the United States' administration did not appear to be fully capable of enforcing its peace brokerage on Israel and was content to apply pressure on the Arab side only. The reasons had much to do with US domestic politics, causing successive US presidents to tilt systematically towards Israel, instead of pursuing strategic alliances in the Middle East [13, p. 90–110]. Nor was the European Union in a position to practise enforced peace brokerage due to difficulty in its consensual decision making processes. As F. Nohra and M. M. Kamal [14, p. 152–180] observe, under its common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the EU provided a substantial aid package for the Palestinian authority in 1994, but failed to condemn the Likud government's subsequent breach of the Oslo accords.

The relevance of psychology in politics and the ground for a track two diplomacy

A key issue in official diplomacy is how to deal with an intractable conflict resulting from opposite incompatible claims. Official diplomats mandated by their own institutions are constrained in their negotiation efforts by the consensual principles inside their political systems. The more high-profile an issue, the narrower their room for manoeuvre.

From a psychological perspective, political acceptance of a settlement is more than a rational calculation. Value systems play a prominent role, as do the shared beliefs of a society and its "collective psychology". Political decision must rely on the support of their civil societies, and are thus bound by these beliefs.

A psychological perspective draws a conflict researcher's attention to the dimensions of values, perceptions, principles and claims dominating in the so-

cieties of the antagonists. Inequality radicalises the claims of the antagonists, and perspectives from group psychology help explain how the perception of inequality and oppression contributes to the intractability of the conflict and locks off the possibilities of a settlement.

P. Coleman [15] spells out the psychosocial factors that create intractable conflicts, such as the history of the oppression and inequality, symbolic and ideological opposition, incompatible claims to resources, conflicting group identities and stereotyping. All contribute to the psychological dimension of intractability, as each antagonist sticks to their initial claims, distrust the other side, blame their opponents for perceived oppressiveness or disruption, and creates a negative narrative perpetuating the conflict.

All of these dimensions are presented in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. M. Darwaza [16, p. 85–110] notes strong perception of inequality and oppression on the Palestinian side, portraying themselves as a scattered and oppressed population suffering at the hand of a powerful nation-state; on the Israeli side, there is an overwhelming sense of distrust and insecurity.

Group psychology may direct a conflict on two opposing tracks: competitive escalation and radicalisation or the overcoming of conflict perceptions, including with the aid of track two diplomacy.

Some of the following concepts from psychosociology are most useful in explaining radicalisation in a conflict:

- S. Asch's "conformity effect" theory [17] explains how political actors feel compelled to go along with the common attitudes of suspicion and rejection of the enemy, or treat these attitudes with intransigence, the strong pressure for conformity created during a conflict often dominates the socialisation of new political leaders;

- N. Kogan and M. Wallach's risk shift theory [18, p. 75–83] explains the tendency of political decision makers to make more radical and hence riskier choices when acting in homogenous group sharing strong views on a political conflict.

The perception of the enemy may have deep roots in history or public opinion, or it could be fabricated by the oligarchy-media condominium. But whatever is the case, the psychological perspective is useful in explaining the radicalisation of a conflict. E. Herman and N. Chomsky [19, p. 64–97] describe the capabilities of the oligarchy-media condominium to exploit the values, feelings and fears existing in a society, frame the image of an enemy, impose a conflict agenda and select a target against which to mobilise. Political leaders feel compelled to conform with the collective perceptions, attitudes and fears, fabricated or not. Sometimes, they find themselves entrapped by the very perceptions that they had helped to spread within the civil society.

Psychosocial dynamics may intervene with diplomacy, to the point of rendering the diplomatic efforts ineffective. Public sentiments and the choices of decision makers may create a downward spiral, making the antagonists more fixed in their claims, and more suspicious and hostile.

Detailed studies on the recent Arab civil wars provide a theoretical framework to explain the transformation of collective perceptions during conflict escalation. D. Della Porta [20, p. 23–40] names four complementary stages of conflict radicalisation:

- the competitive escalation of discourse and practice;
- the ideological encapsulation, with mutual fear and growing distrust, dichotomous vision of the world, perceived as being divided into "us" and "them".
- freedom fighter paradigm: a willingness to reject any solution other than the military one;

- militant cognitive enclosure leading to a system of perception that makes impossible any diplomatic initiative with the other side.

Any diplomacy that addresses the psychology of a conflict to achieve de-escalation and build confidence must essentially be non-official. If we defined conventional diplomacy as track one, such non-official diplomacy might be termed as track-two. Track two diplomacy is carried out mainly by non-official actors and targets the system of perceptions in the antagonistic societies, not the political or power balance in a conflict.

Because track two diplomacy is informal, it effectively supplements official (track one) diplomacy with its inherent constraints. For example, while the official diplomats are often barred from talking to "the enemy", track-two diplomacy works with the perceptions and institutions in both conflicting groups.

Its actors are less dependent on official position in a conflict, and thus enjoy a wider freedom of judgment and opinion and cross boundaries that official diplomats cannot transgress.

Track-two diplomacy has three essential characteristics.

Firstly, it transforms perceptions and representations in the antagonistic societies through education and research, works to alter opinions and discourse through advocacy, and builds a political culture conducive to a peaceful settlement.

Secondly, it changes the conflict environment by engaging civil societies in a variety of initiatives in the realms of the economy, business, and social policy, thus creating common interests between the adversaries. This transformation causes the antagonists to redefine their values and claims and look beyond the "zero-sum" vision of the conflict. As a result, new possibilities for a peaceful settlement are created.

Thirdly, it aims to move a conflict beyond intractability, by changing the adversaries' perception of their fundamental interests.

In short, the evolution of a conflict may put it on either of the following opposing tracks – cognitive enclosure and ideological encapsulation, or overcoming negative stereotypes and adopting a constructive approach to conflict resolution. The consequence of the first is escalating violence; the second track is the way of negotiation, including track two diplomacy initiatives.

Both tracks were present in the Israeli-Arab conflict, from the beginning of the Oslo peace process and gave rise to two opposing paradigms for the antagonists. Over more than half a century of conflict, both sides had fallen into the pattern of ideological enclosure. On the Arab side, it was visible in the character of the this was perceived through the political speeches, and even the vocabulary common among the Arab public who sympathised with the Palestinian cause. On the Israeli side, the Arab neighbours, including Palestinians,

were presented as a security threat for the newborn nation, which can only be addressed by consolidating Israel's alliance with the great powers and non-Arab neighbourhood. The Israeli strategy has been to form a friendly circle of non-Arab nations surrounding the Arab world, which K. Zielinska describes as the periphery doctrine [21].

The political options for the Israeli side can be considered on two levels:

First is Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli decision makers have ruled out any negotiation with the PLO which they consider to be a terrorist organisation. Conversely, the Arab world and the United Nations General Assembly have recognised it as the sole official representative of the Palestinian people. On the Palestinian side, the only remaining option since the June 1967 defeat has been the guerilla war for the liberation of Palestine.

Second is Israeli conflict with the Arab neighbours. Successive Israeli governments have not been fundamentally hostile to peace negotiations with Egypt, Syria and Jordan, providing that the Palestinian claims are disregarded. In turn, the Arab regimes have been balancing between the pursuit of their narrow self-interest in the region and the pan-Arab solidarity with the Palestinians. The move toward one option or the other has depended on many domestic political factors. When the cost or benefit calculation of the top decision makers was in favour of a separate peace deal with Israel contradicted the beliefs and principles of the civil society, they maintained informal if not secret communications with Israel.

The Oslo process changed this post-1991 diplomatic dynamic by mutual recognition between Israel and PLO. The Israeli government downplayed the perception of the latter as a terrorist organisation. On the other hand, the PLO moved its position closer to the two states solution, and this meant giving up the territories occupied in 1948, representing 78 % of Palestine.

Another outcome of this process was that the atmosphere of mutual distrust and lack of cooperation gave way to greater trust and readiness to cooperate. The Madrid process was deadlocked by the refusal of the American and Israeli sides to recognise the PLO as an official partner in the multilateral talks, ruling out any substantial compromise on the principal Palestinian claims. For the Palestinian negotiators, acceptance of the two-state solution required trust in the Israeli government's commitment to withdrawal. On the other hand, allowing the PLO leaders to rule in the West Bank and Gaza depended on Israel's trust in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with Palestinian authorities. This trust-building process could only begin once the official

representatives of the Israeli and the Palestinian side met directly in Oslo.

Nevertheless, the Oslo peace process resulted in two opposite movements. De-escalation, with the ongoing talks producing peace-centred discourses. For the Palestinians, hopes prevailed for the first time that sovereignty and the return of the territories would happen peacefully, and that a successful peace process could lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the Israeli side, there was an increasing readiness to exchange the territories occupied in 1967 for a role as a core state in a new friendly regional order. According to a survey quoted by Arian and Alan Asher in 1994 [22, p. 3–18], 41 % of the surveyed persons accepted the idea of a Palestinian state, as compared to only 26 % in 1990. De-escalation was supported unanimously by the great powers: the US brokered for it, and the European Union and Japan provided massive aid. On the other hand, conservative and radical forces met this move toward peace with hostility: right-wing Israeli movements fundamentally disagreed with any territorial concessions referring to the divine right of the people of Israel to Judea-Samaria (the historical-religious name given to the West Bank). On the Palestinian side, the Hamas movement, that had remained outside the diplomatic game condemned any diminishing the historical rights of the Palestinians. Essentially, Hamas remained on the position of the PLO before the Oslo agreements.

The interplay between these two opposing trends depended on their relative weight in the opposing camps. The failure of the final negotiations at Camp David and the start of the second Intifada were believed to be the key factors in the landslide victory of the right-wing parties in the 2001 Israeli elections and the defeat of the Labour party engaged in the final negotiations.

The peace process was effectively reversed. The Roadmap initiative occupied its place; what started as a negotiation on the two states solution devolved into a discussion on security issues. As Yair Hirschfeld observed [23, p. 250–275], the Israeli demand for an end to the Intifada on the Palestinian side became a prerequisite for further negotiation on the terms of any peace deal.

Again, competitive escalation, and ideological encapsulation returned. Hamas' popularity in the Palestinian territories grew, and so did the electoral support of the right-wing coalitions in the Israeli Knesset. With every iteration of the conflict, increasingly more radical positions came to dominate in public opinion. The B. Netanyahu government Israel adopted an unprecedented tough line on the Palestinians, grounded in a supremacist ethno-religious doctrine⁴.

⁴Since the last two decades, Israeli governments did escalate against the Palestinian people at three levels: against the Palestinians of the West Bank through the acceleration of the land seizure and Israeli population settlement, against the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip by tightening the blockade therefore resulting into a humanitarian disaster, and against the Palestinian of 1948 and Israeli citizens through the "law on the nation state" that introduces a legal hierarchy between Jews and non-Jews. On the other side, the main competing party, and in particular the Blue and White list didn't endorse the former labour's agenda on the peace process, and was focusing on restoring the equality between Israeli citizens inside the territories of 1948.

From track one-and-a-half to multi track – where the Oslo peace process fit

Defined through the lens of the track one process, track two diplomacy in its narrow sense would engage different kinds of conflict resolution professionals who are not official actors but play some role in settling the conflict. At this level, ideological, relational, and political resources are mobilised to provide solutions that the track one cannot provide. The risk is that track two diplomacy becomes a shadow of track one, directed at the same target – antagonistic official actors – and the same goal – finding a settlement between them and putting an immediate end to the conflict.

The boundary between track one and track two is not always clear, especially when the actors are overly focused on the practical outcome of official diplomacy to the neglect of the long-term objective of societal transformation. Between track one and track two lies track one-and-a-half diplomacy, more flexible than track one diplomacy and with greater leverage than track two. According to S. A. Nan [24], track one-and-a-half actors can be facilitators holding unofficial mandates from governmental actors to undertake initiatives that governments cannot officially endorse; alternatively, they may be private actors engaged in such initiatives in a supporting role. J. Mapendere [25, p. 61–81] defined track one-and-a-half as a level of diplomacy between track one and track two, as their actors can be distant and pursue specific agendas. Track one-and-a-half brings track two actors into the track one agenda. A track one-and-a-half actor is deemed to endorse the track two agenda without officially representing it. Official actors may even deny his initiative to save the face, especially in case of failure.

Because the boundaries of track one and track two are so hazy, multiple other track 2+n diplomacies may be described, referring to levels such as culture, science, public opinion and economy. That would be consistent with the typology of seven additional tracks – economic actors and business people, prominent members of the civil society, education institutions, advocacy associations, religious institutions, philanthropic actors and mass media. L. Diamond and J. McDonald [26, p. 5–20] even proposed the concept of multitrack diplomacy.

Despite the specificity of the eight tracks of non-official diplomacy, each fits into the track two diplomacy broadly defined. Unlike track one, track two diplomacy has final settlement as its indirect objective, dedicating itself mainly to the pursuit of a political, social, and cultural transformation. Its immediate purpose is to transform the conflict environment by putting in place the enabling conditions of the tracks two to nine as defined above.

The Oslo peace process began with what could be described as track two diplomacy. Political leaders were sent unofficially to negotiate the peace. They were people like Uri Shavir and Ahmed Quorei, accompanied by renowned professionals from the civil society like

Yair Hirschfeld (professor at Tel Aviv University) and R. Pundak (an Israeli journalist). Prominent Norwegian facilitators included names like T. R. Larsen.

The function of these actors was to persuade the antagonists that political compromise was feasible and most advantageous from a cost-benefit perspective. Another aim was to restore mutual trust.

The Israeli needed assurances of the Palestinian leaders' intent to pursue peace and accept a two-state solution with clear boundaries. The Palestinian side had to be confident about Israel's commitment to such a solution to agree to gradual Israeli withdrawal and a long transitional period.

Activists from the civil societies, experts and regional economic working groups were brought in to assist in moving the conflict beyond the intractability stage.

They did so by introducing new perspectives, and bringing about a change in priorities: both parties finally accepted peace as their top priority and precondition for economic prosperity and regional stability, and hence the need to abandon maximalistic territorial demands. The change in priorities is an essential step towards conflict resolution, according to P. Wallenstein's typology [27, p. 87–129].

But whether this process truly met the definition of track two is a matter of considerable uncertainty. First, the political leaders of both parties, Mahmud Abbas and Yossi Belin were widely engaged, but negotiated without an official mandate, and therefore in a highly secretive and informal atmosphere. Israeli negotiators were taking the risk of going to for negotiating with a "terrorist organisation", and Palestinians were at risk of being denounced as traitors by some of usurping the prerogatives of the Madrid representatives by others. This fits the definition of track one-and-a-half diplomacy extremely well.

Regardless of its qualification, the process was nevertheless considered an immediate success by comparison to the negotiations of the past, which came to a standstill. However, many other Arab states were suspicious. Unlike the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 26 March 1979, when the Arab governments unanimously suspended Egypt from the League of the Arab States, the Oslo peace process divided the Arab world and the governments who opposed it faced the prospect of international isolation. The legitimacy of the PLO in the Arab world broke the taboo for negotiating with Israel among the Arab leaders. Its effect on the system of perceptions and beliefs in the Arab world was obvious. The interruption of the normalisation process between the Arab world and Israel was due mostly to the deadlock of the Oslo process. Years later, the Riyadh summit of 2002 reconfirmed the desirability of the two-state solution and peace with Israel in exchange of the implementation of Resolution UNSC 242.

The United States' track two initiatives that mattered

Track two diplomacy relies on non-official actors and works well when the civil societies enjoy sufficient the freedom of action and substantive factions thereof call for the overcoming of the *status quo* and the exploration of alternative solutions to a conflict.

For the civil societies to push for track two diplomacy, several conditions must be met:

- structural changes during the conflict, such as diversion by other threats perceived as greater, or the destabilisation of an antagonist in ways that render the *status quo* untenable, or any regional changes providing new opportunities for both sides;
- emergence of domestic actors showing a level of maturity and a readiness to change the representations of the conflict;
- sufficient freedom to act and undertake initiatives outside the control of the official authorities, yet, even in a democracy, a track two initiative can be frustrated when the political ruling class supported by mainstream opinion locks off any possibility to “talk to the enemy”, and undertakes an ideological war supported by repressive legislation.

Consequently, scholars close to key US think tanks and decision makers gave priority to the study track two initiatives brought from outside. D. Kaye [28, p. 21–31] notes that several US institutions played a crucial role in drawing the Middle Eastern elites towards track two diplomacy in a three-stage process, the last of which is “transmission to policy” by influencing decision makers.

Successful “transmission to policy” depends on three conditions. Media presence must be low or very low. Also, there need to be an open minded elite and a favourable regional context. Effectively, the more media coverage a track two process receives, the lower its probability of success, because the process contradicts the predominant beliefs and representations in a targeted area.

Success of a track two process also depends on the so-called transfer effect to track one, as described by R. Fisher [29]. According to him, the probability of reversal to track one is a function of the capabilities of the non-official actors of track two to influence policy making at different levels, including government agencies, political institutions, and the diplomatic sphere.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, most track two activities preceding the official peace processes were undocumented. The Israeli-Egyptian peace process came before track one shuttle diplomacy led by H. Kissinger. It altered the basis for the rational calculus by the Egyptian decision makers. As a result, Egypt became an ally of the US, and confidence between the two belligerents grew resulting in a lasting cease fire [30].

Yet the Israeli-Palestinian peace process required a transformation in perceptions. According to anecdotal evidence, senior US officials engaged for about a year in consultations with the PLO leadership, along with multiple think tanks and academics, during the first Palestinian Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza in 1988.

Multilevel mobilisation in the United States gave priority to the Israeli-Arab peace process, which was also multitrack and involved numerous diplomatic channels in parallel. Its participants were renowned US personalities, university projects and select think tanks, including the Carter Centre and Ford foundations. It is even reported US think tanks spent on track two diplomacy between 1.3 and 3.8 mln US dollars from 2002 to 2010⁵.

The need for track two diplomacy correlated with the political constraints to which the top decision makers were subject in United States, as reported by J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt [31]. Their bias towards Israel echoed domestic concerns, and any presidential administration that tried to give them less attention faced pressure at least from powerful pressure groups and evangelical right-wing activists, and occasional opposition from congress.

The Oslo process, seen as a consequence of the stalemated Madrid process, was facilitated by track two and track one-and-a-half initiatives in Israel and Palestine as an extension of the preceding track two diplomacy of the US.

Long-term multilevel consultations with the PLO was essential for the settlement of two issues: recognition of the state of Israel – which meant abandoning the claim to the Palestinian territories occupied in 1948 and agreeing to Israel’s gradual withdrawal from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967.

This initiative could not have grown from within the scattered Palestinian political landscape. The consensus among the Palestinian population outside the 1948 territories was to press for the return of all the occupied land and the restoration of Palestinian sovereignty over them. After the June 1982 defeat and the Israeli invasion in Lebanon, Yasser Arafat’s leadership in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon was challenged by the hardliners opposed to any dialogue with pro-American Arab governments⁶, while the Palestinians inside the 1967 territories were receptive to the influence of Hamas after the first Intifada. The Palestinians who remained in the 1948 territories and became Israeli citizens were more concerned by equality and the struggle against discrimination. Therefore, a change in the leadership’s fundamental doctrine could hardly produce a consensus without a long-term action plan.

⁵In reference to the following Princeton University workshop. See: Bridging divides: track two diplomacy in the Middle East. Princeton : Princeton Univ., 2013. 32 p.

⁶With a reference to the Syrian brokered insurgency led by Abu Mussa inside the Fatah movement since 1983. The latter blamed Yasser Arafat for not standing still on a hard nationalist line.

While top-down action was essential for the fundamental change of doctrine, it still had to be accepted by the grassroots. Such acceptance still remained the crucial problem of the track one-and-a-half and track two processes of Oslo. Two issues were excluded from the immediate agenda and postponed until the close: the status of East Jerusalem and the rights of the Palestinian refugees expelled from their land in 1948 – i. e. the Israeli territory as of 1948.

The success of transmission to policy and thus to track one diplomacy was moderated by the shortcuts used, and especially the secrecy and intensity of the exchanges among the top leaderships of both sides with the mediation of the US official and non-official actors.

Nevertheless, the main flaw was the lack of a top-down interaction: for example, a compromise accepted and confirmed by the top leadership of the PLO would overlook the refugees' return from the camps in the neighbouring Arab countries. Likewise, the Israeli Labour leadership had to engage with the conservative part of the public opinion opposed to territorial compromise. The Palestinians considered the whole Palestine as "stolen" and pressed for its return, the Israeli conservatives stuck to the territorial-nationalist interpretation of their religious narrative, considering Palestine as *Eretz Israel*, the land promised to them in the sacred texts. Therefore, they insisted on holding on to these lands with various degrees of firmness. For instance, Jerusalem was to be excluded from any deal. These obstacles to the process eventually led to a Likud majority succeeding the Israeli Labour coalition a few years later. In the Israeli system of proportional representation, the smaller religious parties were putting pressure on the Labour governments pre-

venting it from winning an absolute majority, causing Ehud Barak's to backtrack on Jerusalem before the Camp David talks.

Ultimately, the problem of the peace process was the lack of transmission to the grassroots of the changes negotiated at the top. This explains how the question of the 1948 refugees was included in the agenda: the 4.5 mln Palestinian refugees expelled by the Israelis in 1948, insisted on their right to return, while the Israelis found this demand unacceptable fearing it could change the demographic balance. On its part, the Palestinian leadership could not afford to disregard a fundamental demand of their constituency.

The other fundamental disagreement, on East Jerusalem, brought the final negotiations to a deadlock. To E. Cuhadar [32], this was the consequence of the lack of transfer from track two to track one. Despite Ehud Barak's aversion to bringing the issue to the table, Israeli track two activists succeeded in convincing the negotiators, who proposed a unique solution of shared control over the old Jerusalem. On the Palestinian side – that insisted on the inclusion of this issue in the first place – transmission by the track two actors was less efficient and limited the room for negotiating for the Palestinian side.

One point of contention between the PLO and the Israeli government concerned the way to proceed with the talks. While Mahmud Abbas sought to engage multiple non-official actors in the dual track two – track one process, Ehud Barak was acting under serious time pressure and insisted on a track one agenda. He asked to negotiate with Mohamed Dahlan, the focal point for security cooperation, not Mahmud Abbas. In the process, concerns about a hostile grassroots reaction reached the summit, precluding the final settlement.

Failure to involve the grassroots and the limitations of civil society organisations

As observed by J. P. Lederach [33, p. 38–55], track two diplomacy works where there is an interaction at three levels of leadership in a society:

- the top rank with a mandate to enter and conduct negotiations and make political decisions;
- the middle level, working with input from multiple sectors such as religious, economic, and academic leaders;
- the grassroots level, reaching out to the local communities.

Every level is relevant. The top rank has leverage over political decision-making on the settlement of a conflict, but must act within domestic and international political constraints.

The middle rank enjoys a wider space for political manoeuvre, and can afford to think outside the box and propose novel solutions. The grassroots level has the benefit of knowing and being in touch with the local communities, and also the capability to influence political behaviour on the ground.

To be lasting, reconciliation has to happen at the grassroots level through a process grounded in J. P. Le-

derach's four principles: peace, mercy, truth and justice [33, p. 23–37]. Their understanding by the civil society is crucial to the success of diplomacy.

Level two (middle leadership) and level three (grassroots leadership) include civil society organisations, some of which are active in peace building and conflict resolution, and recognised as peace and conflict resolution organisations (P/CRO) [33, p. 15–39]. P/CROs are crucial actors in track two diplomacy because they work on laying the foundations for a diplomatic settlement.

The activists and leaders of P/CROs are individuals with social and (or) professional reputation and credibility inside the civil society.

The success of a P/CRO depends on many factors, such as credibility among the conflicting groups, steadfastness in adhering to the political culture of peace where mainstream opinion favours confrontation, capacity to influence the broader society and the political elite.

P/CRO's facilitates the diplomatic settlement of a conflict by changing the public perceptions and priorities in the conflicting parties, and specifically by

influencing level two and level three leaders, and ultimately political leadership at level one.

O. Gross [34] underlines the multidimensional nature of grassroots reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, there is a high degree of economic interdependency between Israel and the 1967 Palestinian territories. In 1995, one-third of all jobs occupied by Palestinians were in Israel. However, the cultural groundwork for peace was still lacking, owing to the prevalence of hostile perceptions on both sides. While Palestinians saw themselves as victims of oppression and injustice, fear and suspicion reigned on the Israeli side. In the typology of L. Diamond and J. McDonald, track four to nine diplomacies had failed in this regard.

In Israel, P/CROs – considered in multiple studies – have contributed extensively to the transmission at the grassroots level of political doctrines conducive to peace. A prominent Israeli P/CRO, the Israeli Committee for Israeli Palestinian Peace, has advocated for peaceful negotiations and contacts with PLO leaders from the 1970s. The Peace now movement, which supported the continuation of Israel's peace talks with Egypt in 1978, eventually took up new causes, like the mistreatment of Palestinians in the 1967 occupied territories. The movement led a mass demonstration against the Sabra and Shatila genocide in Lebanon in September 1982, forcing the resignations Menahem Begin and Ariel Sharon. Despite its endorsement of Zionist ideals, the Peace now movement influenced the Oslo agenda of the Y. Rabin government and supported the negotiation process. Yet paradoxically, it was excluded from it. Other peace movements have dedicated themselves to more specific causes, such as Bat Shalom, Women for

Peace, Rabbis for Human Rights, and the [Palestinian] Land Defense Committee.

Israeli peace organisations have suffered from the ideological encapsulation produced by the Israeli-Palestinian wars. They have worked to narrow the divide between antagonistic perceptions. In addition, they confronted the mainstream opinion that supported the nationalist and pro-military posture and emphasised security concerns [35, p. 94–130]. They contributed to reducing the ethnic divisions that exacerbated the conflict in the socio-cognitive, political, and ideological spheres. Yet there is still a wide gap between the pacifist discourse of the peace organisations mainstream opinion, favouring militarist approaches to regional politics, as detailed by T. Hermann [35].

On the Palestinian side, diverse and multiple traumas worked against a consensual strategy in support of the peace process. While a large number of the 1967 refugees contributed to the peace process based on a two states solution, the 1948 refugees could not any peace deal that excluded them from the right to return. On the other hand, any provision for this right in the final peace agreement was unacceptable for more than 90 % of the Israelis [22, p. 129–160].

Here, the basis of the US led track two process becomes visible: it is to convince the Palestinians to adjust their demands to the “fait accompli” of Israeli expansion and create a cognitive environment that would bring them to reconsider their place in the new unequal balance of power. The cognitive environment for the Israelis was less demanding and more secure: it was to bring Israel to abandon its ambitions for further territorial annexations.

The deadlock in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiation and the way for another biased diplomacy

The starting point of our narrative was the argument that Israeli-Palestinian confrontation was a clear example of an intractable conflict from the beginning: two peoples lay claim to the same land, and assert their absolute rights to it. For the Israelis, this right is based on theology, ancient history or both. For the Palestinians, it is the right to return to the land that they lost a few decades before.

The challenge for diplomacy was to move the conflict beyond intractability. The paradigm of the rational-utilitarian actor alone cannot explain the decisions of the antagonists to pursue peace over war. On the Palestinian side, PLO's loss of regional support, resources, and political influence cannot fully account for the drastic compromise that its top leadership accepted at the expense of a core value shared by its militant wing and many of its leaders. Likewise, on the Israeli side the cause of national security argument is more than the rational estimation of the risk of withdrawal to the 1949 borders. Most Palestinian territories are ves-

ted in Israel with strong religious symbolism, bolstered by right-wing activism.

Therefore, to push the antagonists towards peace, it was essential to alter the perceptions, attitudes and core values of the belligerents. Here, track two diplomacy played a visible role. The causes of the war-like attitudes and perceptions were mainly domestic, and of a third party, the United States, was crucial to the process. Despite the inability of the US track one diplomacy to move beyond the Israeli red lines, many US think tanks, non-official diplomats and intellectuals mobilised significant resources to change the antagonists' core values and perceptions. Their main focus was on accommodating the mindset of the Palestinian elite to what could be tractable for the Israeli political leaders ready for a territorial compromise.

Transmission of the changes in perception to track one was sufficient to get the peace process started by clearing the ground for mutual compromise, even though the key questions of the agenda were postponed

to the end of the talks. Yet much of the negotiation journey was closer to track one-and-a-half.

For each side, the success of the negotiated settlement required positive interaction among three levels: top leadership, middle leadership, and the grassroots, and its lack was perhaps the main weakness of the negotiations. On the Israeli side, P/CROs did not succeed in transforming the ideological environment shaped by half a century of regional confrontation. Transformation remained most likely among those who were open to the alternatives to a hardline theological-political narrative. On the Palestinian side, it proved impossible to convince the grassroots, especially among the refugees, to give up the "right to return", which the mainstream Israeli opinion found unacceptable, or to push through narrower vision of the core values.

Finally, 21 years of backtracking in the peace process reflected the two directional dynamic of the move towards a peaceful settlement, where dialogue and mutual understanding is juxtaposed with escalation. Due to the limitations of this research, it was not possible to explain in detail the evolution of the process into further tracks. Suffice it to say for the time being that P. Lederach's four constants – truth, mercy, justice and peace – were not presented in the process to a sufficient degree. The Israeli governments' efforts to end the conflict since 2001 were largely deprived of truth and justice. Their moves were mostly unilateral, the A. Sharon, and then the E. Olmert governments took a tough repressive approach, conducted a policy of ethnic separation (e. g. construction of the wall), and performed followed a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and locked off of the West Bank in keeping with the slogan "maximum Arabs on minimum land" [37]. The B. Netanyahu government further upped the pressure by accelerating the settlement policy, expelling the Palestinians from their lands and enacting the law on the "nation state" that instituted a hierarchy between Jews and non-Jews and legalised discrimination against Arabs. Public sentiments within the conflicting parties will represent an even greater challenge for any further attempt at track two diplomacy. The escalation in autumn 2000 radicalised public opinion, especially in-

side Israel. Two decades later, in 2019, 48 % of Israeli respondents supported the annexation of *area C* lands representing 61–62 % of the West Bank, 36 % favoured the expulsion of the Palestinians living there, and 71 % considered the whole of Jerusalem the capital of Israel⁷.

With this change in mind, the US administrations have considered another round of diplomacy that would ignore the Palestinians' position altogether. The approach was essentially a reversal to the past strategy consistent with B. Gurion's "periphery doctrine" that called for consolidating Israel's relations with the non-Arab and (or) non-Muslim states. The dismantlement of the Arab national dimension with the US occupation of Iraq and the spread of the civil war in Iraq and Syria, gave rise to new entities disconnected from the concerns of the Arab mainstream [38]. Improving cooperation with the Kurdish regional government in Iraq and with South Sudan did not call for a track two diplomacy, but were the result of official but secret contacts on both sides [39].

Also undermining a future track two process are the new perceptions of threats and enemies for the Arab states⁸ [40; 91–129]. The search for a response could push the Arab governments to consider a normalisation with Israel without the settlement of the Palestinian issue. This could bring about a track-minus-two process: the perceived seriousness of these threats among the elites and sections of the public opinion could draw the Arab states towards a new kind of cooperation with Israel as a security provider, regardless of their attitude to the Palestinians⁹. Again, this would necessitate the abandonment of Arab national causes in the Arab societies, but there is no evidence of this happening today. An empirical study undertaken by Yûsuf Sawâni [41, p. 20–28] for the Centre for Arab Unity Studies in Beirut concluded that Arab national concerns and the prospect for an Arab political integration were still mainstream in the Arab societies, with more than 70 % of those surveyed in favour of Arab economic and political integration. In summary, the new perceptions of threats and enemies in the Arab world could make the new track two peace process vastly different from the first.

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⁷Jewish virtual library [Electronic resource]. URL: www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org (date of access: 09.02.2022).

⁸We found many reasons behind the fabrication of the new threats. A great number of US publications did focus on it, since the 1990s. In addition, some information, resulting from private discussions is not yet confirmed by public statements about teaching the Iranian threat to the Arab trainees in the US military academies. The Israeli publications from institutions like the Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies and Medias like I24 television in Arabic, did play a secondary role. Instead, many books and papers published as a reaction to the recent Arab turmoil since 2011 did develop their argumentation on combined domestic threats from the Muslim Brethren and on regional threats from Iran.

⁹Miller A. D. How Israel and the Arab world are making peace without a peace deal [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/27/how-israel-and-arab-world-are-making-peace-without-peace-deal-pub-81918> (date of access: 09.02.2022).

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