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THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON DIGITAL INTEGRATION PROSPECTS IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION AND THE UNION STATE

D. A. BOCHKOV^a

^aBelarusian State University, 4 Niezaliezhnasci Avenue, Minsk 220030, Belarus

Abstract. This article examines the geopolitical risks and security risks arising from the rapid deployment of artificial intelligence in the absence of binding international legal standards. As states increasingly apply artificial intelligence in military contexts, it has acquired clear dual-use characteristics, which may intensify geopolitical competition and security dilemmas. For the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, this trend constitutes a significant contemporary challenge. Because international legal regulation remains fragmented, states are independently developing national regulatory frameworks for artificial intelligence systems. Divergent national approaches, uneven technological development among states, and the acceleration of artificial intelligence related arms competition compound these difficulties. The article analyses the economic, humanitarian, and military risks associated with artificial intelligence and proposes strategies to address these regulatory gaps, contextualised within the national interests of the Republic of Belarus and its partners in regional integration alliances. The author concludes that deeper digital integration and the establishment of a «belt of digital good-neighbourliness» may contribute to sustainable development and the protection of national sovereignty in the contemporary technological landscape.

Keywords: artificial intelligence; Republic of Belarus; international regulation; national security; technological competition; digital sovereignty; United States; Eurasian Economic Union; Eurasian integration; soft power.

ВЛИЯНИЕ ИСКУССТВЕННОГО ИНТЕЛЛЕКТА НА ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ ЦИФРОВОЙ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ В РАМКАХ ЕВРАЗИЙСКОГО ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО СОЮЗА И СОЮЗНОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА

Д. А. БОЧКОВ¹⁾

¹⁾Белорусский государственный университет, пр. Независимости, 4, 220030, г. Минск, Беларусь

Аннотация. Рассматриваются актуальные угрозы, связанные с внедрением технологий искусственного интеллекта, в условиях отсутствия международных правовых стандартов в этой области. Применение искусственного интеллекта в военных целях превращает его в технологию двойного назначения, усиливая геополитическую напряженность, что становится одним из главных вызовов современности для стран – членов Евразийского экономического союза. Пока международное правовое регулирование остается фрагментарным и разрозненным, государствам приходится самостоятельно искать национальные подходы к разработке и внедрению таких систем. Наряду с различиями в национальных подходах проблема усугубляется неравномерным технологическим развитием стран, а также гонкой вооружений на основе искусственного интеллекта. Исследуются экономические, гуманитарные и военные риски, связанные с искусственным интеллектом, и предлагаются перспективные направления для устранения пробелов в регулировании в этой сфере с учетом интересов Республики Беларусь и других стран – участниц интеграционных

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Автор:

Дмитрий Александрович Бочков – соискатель кафедры международных отношений факультета международных отношений. Научный руководитель – кандидат политических наук, доцент Е. А. Достанко.

Author:

Dmitry A. Bochkov, competitor at the department of international relations, faculty of international relations.
dbochkov@ont.by

объединений. Делается вывод о том, что существует необходимость глубокой цифровой интеграции и формирования «пояса цифрового добрососедства» для обеспечения устойчивого развития и защиты национальных интересов государств в новых технологических реалиях.

Ключевые слова: искусственный интеллект; Республика Беларусь; международное регулирование; национальная безопасность; технологическая гонка; цифровой суверенитет; США; Евразийский экономический союз; евразийская интеграция; мягкая сила.

Introduction

The international community has not yet reached consensus on comprehensive legal frameworks for artificial intelligence (AI). At the same time, individual states, in cooperation with major technology corporations, are actively integrating AI into military planning and operations.

This technology can no longer be viewed solely as a neutral instrument, its recent deployment in Middle Eastern military operations demonstrates its dual-use character. Consequently, the proliferation of AI presents challenges to national security that extend beyond economic competition.

In the absence of unified international legal standards, states are developing independent regulatory frameworks.

Despite heightened attention to these issues and widespread concern surrounding them, there remains a notable lack of substantial foundational research published from the perspective of the EAEU and the national interests of the Republic of Belarus. Much of the existing discussion takes place on online analytical platforms, while the published literature is dominated by survey-based and analytical studies that systematise theoretical approaches and assess broader geopolitical implications.

A number of earlier studies anticipated not only the general trajectory of technological change but also some of its specific consequences, thereby making it possible to identify recurring patterns. For example, K. E. Koktysh from MGIMO University argues that algorithms generate cognitive vulnerability and treats this as a stable feature of contemporary society. He further develops ideas associated with the British futurist J. Lovelock, who identified information as the principal driver of a new era and described the culture emerging from algorithms and artificial intelligence as «algocognitive» [1, p. 50].

The consequences of decisions made by machine intelligence without human involvement are difficult to predict. Questions of responsibility in such cases remain contested and have yet to receive a definitive answer. In this context, J. Barrat proposes treating AI that has escaped meaningful human control as a phenomenon fundamentally distinct from conventional technological accidents [2, p. 45].

Several studies conceptualise AI not merely as a technology, but as a factor reshaping the international environment. They address issues such as information security in diplomacy, personal data protection on social media platforms, and the mitigation of algorithmic bias [3].

Many authors further argue that AI intensifies competition over technological sovereignty and alters prevailing understandings of power. These developments are directly relevant to Eurasian integration projects. Within this framework, scholars analyse the transformative effects of AI on the structure of global geopolitics, where traditional great-power rivalry is acquiring an increasingly pronounced technological dimension [4].

Related scholarship also examines the implications of Industry 4.0 technologies for information security. This line of analysis is consistent with the arguments advanced by K. Schwab, founder and Executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, who characterises the present transition as the Industry 4.0 and identifies AI as one of its core components, alongside ubiquitous mobile internet, compact production technologies, and machine-learning systems [5, p. 16].

In seeking to capture the scale of prospective social transformation, some authors rely on historical analogy. They compare current developments in business to the early 19th-century industrial revolution, when firms that failed to move from manual to mechanised production were outcompeted by more adaptive rivals. From this perspective, contemporary businesses face a comparable strategic choice [6].

In 2014, before AI had become a routine term in everyday public discourse, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professors E. Brynjolfsson and A. McAfee described the period as the 2nd machine age and characterised the emerging global transformation as an epidemic-like surge in which digitalisation would enable the creation of unprecedented things [5].

At the same time, although constructive potential of AI, including its use in theoretical research, medicine, and the replacement of humans in hazardous industrial settings, creates significant opportunities, other dimensions of its development, particularly in the military sphere, give rise to concern. One of the principal risks is the emergence of AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. In recent years, this issue has received sustained attention in international scholarship. For example, P. Scharre, a Pentagon expert involved in drafting the US directive on weapons autonomy, argues that technological evolution will transform the character of future interstate conflict and stresses the need for strict human control over key military command-and-control systems [7, p. 317]. Similar conclusions appear in an official report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, which underscores the need to develop

multilateral diplomatic mechanisms capable of preventing an uncontrolled digital arms race. The report also examines in detail the risks of inadvertent escalation associated with autonomous platforms in the absence of global verification standards¹.

Across this body of literature, the principal objectives are generally to improve understanding of the opportunities and risks associated with AI, support the development of trustworthy AI while limiting its uncontrolled proliferation, and strengthen preparedness to mitigate and respond to adverse consequences².

These debates are directly relevant to the EAEU, since digital integration is not feasible without the harmonisation of rules, standards, and shared understandings regarding the acceptable limits of automation. From this standpoint, AI is not simply an auxiliary tool, but a constitutive factor in the integration process [8; 9].

Domestic scholarship has likewise engaged with these questions. In particular, a collective volume edited by N. S. Minko synthesises advanced international experience in the regulation of digital innovation

and examines the challenges involved in aligning legislative approaches within the Eurasian integration framework. The authors place particular emphasis on mechanisms for allocating legal responsibility where autonomous algorithms are used, the legal status of outputs generated through machine creativity, and the protection of national interests within a common digital space [10].

This article aims to identify the principal threats associated with the accelerated deployment of AI in the absence of effective international regulatory mechanisms and to propose key directions for digital integration within the EAEU and the Union State. To that end, it pursues three objectives: to identify the main risks arising from the application of AI and assess their potential gravity; to draw on relevant international experience in the development of legal standards; and, on that basis, to formulate proposals aimed at minimising these risks for the Republic of Belarus and its partners in the region's principal integration frameworks.

Main part

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched a military operation against Iran in which American forces employed several AI tools. These included the a digital flight management tool «Maven smart system» processing data from more than 150 sources, developed by company «Palantir technologies» and «Claude» an AI tool from Anthropic PBC³.

The speed with which new systems are being introduced into the US armed forces is notable. In March 2024, the US Army contracted company «Palantir technologies» for 178.4 mln US dollars to develop systems «TITAN» (tactical intelligence targeting access node), which utilise AI to accelerate data transfer for situational awareness and weapons control⁴. Reports indicate that two systems were delivered one year later⁵, followed by claims of operational use in an actual conflict against Iran.

The military application of AI remains highly contentious. At the summit «Responsible AI in the military domain» held in Spain on 5 February 2026, major

powers, including the United States and China, declined to endorse the final declaration on technological regulation and accountability. The document was not an international treaty and did not create legally binding rights or obligations. In effect, only 35 of 85 participating states signed a voluntary commitment to observe principles regarding AI⁶.

A pronounced asymmetry in capabilities between states raises questions about how digital transformation affects sovereignty.

Speaking at the open debate of the UN Security Council on «Artificial intelligence, international peace and security» on 25 September 2025, the Minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Belarus, M. V. Ryzhenkov, referred to a troubling tendency in which «a new curtain is being created, this time not ideological but technological, a silicon curtain, intended to divide the West from the rest of the world, the global majority, and return those countries to a new form of neo-colonialism»⁷. This perspective is reinforced by concerns regarding the

¹Exploring synthetic data for artificial intelligence and autonomous systems: a primer // UNIDIR : website. URL: <https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-synthetic-data-for-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-a-primer/> (date of access: 04.04.2026).

²Strategic cooperation on AI: core functions // RAND corporation : website. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3849-1.html (date of access: 04.04.2026).

³U.S. military relying on AI as key tool to speed Iran operations // Bloomberg : website. URL: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/us-military-relying-on-ai-as-key-tool-to-speed-iran-operations/> (date of access: 04.04.2026).

⁴Army selects Palantir to deliver TITAN next-generation deep sensing capability in prototype maturation phase // Palantir investors : website. URL: <https://investors.palantir.com/news-details/2024/Army-Selects-Palantir-to-Deliver-TITAN-Next-Generation-Deep-Sensing-Capability-in-Prototype-Maturation-Phase> (date of access: 04.04.2026).

⁵Palantir delivers first 2 next-gen targeting systems to Army // Defense news : website. URL: <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/03/07/palantir-delivers-first-2-next-gen-targeting-systems-to-army/> (date of access: 04.04.2026).

⁶The US and China have not signed a declaration regulating AI for military purposes // RBC : website. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/06/02/2026/69857f5e9a794734f104b323> (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

⁷Minister of foreign affairs of Belarus M. Ryzhenkov takes part in the high-level week of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly (third day) // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus : website. URL: https://mfa.gov.by/en/press/news_mfa/d622af9045846cb8.html (date of access: 04.04.2026).

capacity of major technology corporations to exercise extraterritorial control over information flows. The Republic of Belarus has direct experience of such restrictions. For example, in April 2026, videohosting *YouTube* removed the channels of several major Belarusian state media outlets, including ONT, STV, and BelTA, without explanation. The platform maintained this restriction despite objections from Belarusian, Russian, and international journalistic federations citing international freedom of speech norms⁸. Given that *Google* (the owner of *YouTube*), is a major AI developer, there is a possibility that AI models could be used for political censorship or for the creation of curated digital environments that selectively shape users' perceptions of events. In this context, digital diplomacy scholar I. Manor conceptualises AI power as generative capacity of AI to mould user perceptions. He cites research suggesting rising levels of trust in AI as an information source, which in turn indicates the potential for indirect ideological influence through algorithms⁹.

Global technological inequality exacerbates these risks. The International Telecommunication Union reported that, despite a 240-million increase in internet users in 2025, and 2.2 bln people remained offline¹⁰. This digital divide prevents over a quarter of the global population from acquiring essential digital skills, structurally disadvantaging their respective states in technological competition.

Progress toward unified international standards has been limited. Earlier attempts to address regulatory gaps include the Summit of the future convened in September 2024 at the initiative of UN Secretary General A. Guterres, which produced the Pact for the future and the Global digital compact. While these documents aimed to bridge the digital divide, they also introduced contested governance models. Russian deputy Minister of foreign affairs S. V. Vershinin criticised elements of these initiatives, particularly the elevation of non-governmental actors to parity with sovereign states in technological decision-making and the creation of review mechanisms with ambiguous mandates¹¹.

Confronted with multilateral gridlock and intensifying competitive pressures, states are independently

defining the legal and ethical boundaries of sovereign AI development.

The approaches of two leading AI powers (the United States and China) illustrate this dynamic.

In the United States, D. Trump issued an executive order that established a unified approach to AI regulation while limiting state intervention, with the stated aim of maintaining competitiveness. The order states: «To succeed, American artificial intelligence companies must be able to innovate without burdensome regulation»¹². This deregulatory approach primarily benefits major technology corporations such as *OpenAI* and *Google*, as well as venture capital firms such as *Andreessen Horowitz*.

Conversely, China has pursued iterative regulatory development. The Interim measures for the management of generative artificial intelligence services¹³, effective August 2023, prohibit the generation of content that threatens national security or contravenes socialist values, mandate the use of lawful training data, and require the prompt removal of illicit material.

Furthermore, regulations implemented in November 2025 require AI developers to filter politically sensitive information from chatbot training data and systematically label AI-generated content. These norms were reportedly developed jointly by authorities and technology companies, including *Alibaba* and *DeepSeek*. However, analysts suggest that Chinese authorities are reluctant to impose excessive legislative control that might compromise competitive advantages against the United States¹⁴. China's approach therefore appears to balance state control, including national security and ideological requirements, with innovation.

In this competition, which encompasses both technological rivalry and measures such as US restrictions on chip exports to China, a division of responsibilities may eventually emerge: the United States might focus on innovation and advanced solutions, while China might concentrate on scaling products. For example, at the APEC summit in Gyeongju, Xi Jinping proposed a global AI cooperation organisation and committed to collaborating with APEC members to improve

⁸World Federation of Journalists condemned the blocking of Belarusian media on YouTube // BelTA. URL: <https://belta.by/society/view/vsemirnaja-federatsija-zhurnalistov-osudila-blokirovku-belorusskih-smi-v-youtube-773736-2026/> (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

⁹Manor I. AI's country of origin effect // Exploring digital diplomacy : website. URL: <https://digdipblog.com/2025/08/21/ais-country-of-origin-effect/> (date of access: 11.04.2026).

¹⁰Global number of Internet users increases, but disparities deepen key digital divides // International Telecommunication Union : website. URL: <https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/PR-2025-11-17-Facts-and-Figures.aspx> (date of access: 05.04.2026).

¹¹Speech by S. Vershinin, deputy Minister of foreign affairs of Russia, at the Summit for the future // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation : website. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1970892/ (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

¹²Korzhova D. Trump signed an executive order on a unified AI regulatory framework // Forbes Russia : website. URL: <https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/551834-tramp-podpisal-ukaz-o-edinoj-sisteme-regulirovania-ii> (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

¹³Interim measures for the management of generative artificial intelligence services // Cyberspace administration of China : website. URL: https://www.cac.gov.cn/2023-07/13/c_1690898327029107.htm (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Chin.).

¹⁴Stu Woo. China is worried AI threatens party rule – and is trying to tame it // The Wall Street Journal : website. URL: https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/china-is-worried-ai-threatens-party-ruleand-is-trying-to-tame-it-bfdcd2d?mod=hp_lead_pos8 (date of access: 04.04.2026).

digital literacy and bridge the technological gap in the Asia – Pacific region¹⁵.

Improvement of AI legislation is also a concern within the EAEU. Russia provides an important example.

In 2026, Russia significantly intensified its work on AI adoption and regulation. In February, a presidential decree established a commission on AI development¹⁶, tasked with formulating a National plan to integrate AI across critical sectors, including manufacturing, logistics, energy, public administration, and education, by 2030.

On 19 January 2026, the Big Data Association, comprising *Yandex*, *VK*, *Sber*, *Gazprombank*, *T-Bank*, *Rosselkhozbank*, *Tochka Bank*, *Megafon*, *Rostelecom*, *Beeline*, *MTS*, and others, submitted proposals on AI regulation to the Ministry of Digital Development, advocating increased data availability for AI training¹⁷.

Subsequently, in April, V. Putin emphasised that sovereign large language models constitute a foundational cross-cutting technology critical for «sovereign development», and linked domestic models to defence and security objectives¹⁸.

Kazakhstan has also introduced significant initiatives within the EAEU context. It has presented a national AI platform that reportedly provides access to supercomputers, large language models, and 120 state databases¹⁹. At the June 2025 Eurasian economic forum, K.-J. Tokayev announced that Kazakhstan would leverage its 2026 EAEU chairmanship to prioritise digitalisation and AI. He cited projections that by 2030 AI could contribute over 15 trln US dollars to global GDP²⁰.

EAEU discussions have included proposals ranging from a framework agreement on AI to harmonised legal norms, for example, common approaches to delegating decision-making authority from humans to machine systems. This work is likely to reach a new level in 2026.

At the forum «Digital Kazakhstan – 2026» in Chimgent on 27 March, the chair of the Board of the Eurasian

Economic Commission, B. Sagintaev, reported that EAEU member states are developing the concept of a «digital union». This framework aims to synchronise regional technological solutions while safeguarding individual member states' digital sovereignty²¹.

At the 3rd Minsk international conference on Eurasian security, A. Lukashenko argued that an uncontrolled AI race could transform AI from a beneficial resource into a weapon, potentially even comparable to weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, Belarus proposed establishing a «belt of digital good-neighbourliness» across Eurasia, grounded in principles of digital sovereignty and neutrality, as part of a proposed Charter of multipolarity and diversity²².

Given the intensity of global technological competition and the potential negative consequences of falling behind, EAEU countries face pressure to move beyond extended conceptual deliberation on forming a unified digital space. Reliance on technological solutions already existing within the union appears practical. The experience of Kazakhstan and Russia could form the core around which both scientific-technical and legal frameworks in AI might develop.

Russia has designated such regional cooperation as a priority. During a meeting on 10 April 2026 with members of a special commission and representatives of leading technology companies, V. Putin identified key areas for the introduction of systemic AI solutions. He specifically stressed the need to promote Russian AI systems and related services in foreign markets and to develop cooperation in this field with partners in the CIS, the SCO, and BRICS²³.

Current trends in AI development and deployment suggest that sovereign capabilities in this field may acquire strategic importance comparable, in some respects, to possession of a nuclear arsenal. Digital integration would therefore involve the transfer not only

¹⁵Full text of Xi Jinping's speech at the 2nd session of the 32nd APEC informal leaders' meeting // China global television network : website. URL: <https://russian.cgtn.com/news/2025-11-01/1984503885328445441/index.html> (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

¹⁶On the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation on the development of artificial intelligence technologies : Decree of the President of Rus. Federation, 26 Feb. 2026, No. 116 // President of Russia : website. URL: <https://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/rvxyuQZDJyyRlM5fT2pu8hw43znuHbIU.pdf> (date of access: 11.04.2026) (in Russ.).

¹⁷This is the basis: what amendments to the legislation has been proposed by business for AI development // Forbes Russia : website. URL: <https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/553967-eto-baza-kakie-popravki-v-zakonodatel-stvo-predlozil-biznes-dla-razvitia-ii> (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

¹⁸Meeting on development of AI technologies // President of Russia : website. URL: <https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79525> (date of access: 11.04.2026).

¹⁹Kazakhstan presents national AI platform // Kapital. Business information centre : website. URL: <https://kapital.kz/tehnology/146318/v-kazahstane-predstavili-nacionalnuyu-platformu-ii.html> (date of access: 11.04.2026) (in Russ.).

²⁰Tokaev: digitalization and artificial intelligence should be an unconditional priority of the EAEU // BelTA. URL: <https://belta.by/economics/view/tokaev-tsifrovizatsiya-iskusstvennyj-intellekt-dolzhen-stat-bezuslovnym-prioritetom-eaes-723246-2025/> (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

²¹Bakytzhan Sagintayev: «The commission and the EAEU states are preparing a Joint statement on the responsible development of artificial intelligence» // Eurasian Economic Commission : website. URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/news/bakytzhan-sagintayev-komissiya-i-gosudarstva-eaes-gotovyat-sovmestnoe-zayavlenie-ob-otvetstvennom-raz/> (date of access: 04.04.2026).

²²Participation in the 3rd Minsk international conference on Eurasian security // President of the Republic of Belarus : website. URL: <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/ucastie-v-iii-minskoj-mezhdunarodnoj-konferencii-po-evrazijskoj-bezopasnosti> (date of access: 11.04.2026) (in Russ.).

²³Meeting on development of AI technologies // President of Russia : website. URL: <https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79525> (date of access: 11.04.2026).

of technologies but also, to some extent, of elements of sovereignty. This requires exceptional trust and structural guarantees between participating states. Shared economic interests, cultural ties, and aligned state values function as important indicators of reliability for such long-term cooperation.

Within this paradigm, the comprehensive integration between Belarus and Russia readily extends to the digital sphere. Joint provision of military security within the Union State²⁴, together with the transfer by Russia to Belarus of tactical nuclear weapons and the latest missile system «Oreshnik», indicates a high level of trust between the two states.

A robust foundation also exists for deeper digital integration with China. This includes the special status of the all-weather strategic partnership between the two states, the membership of Minsk and Beijing in the SCO, and many years of effective cooperation in various fields.

Alignments in historical interpretation further support these strategic partnerships. The 2025 commemorations in Minsk, Moscow, and Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of the conclusion of the World War II functioned not merely as cultural and historical events. The attendance and absence of specific international delegations highlighted differences in diplomatic positioning between Western states and the Global South²⁵. In contemporary international relations, a clear articulation of national historical positions based on documented historical record, together with adherence to the letter and spirit of the UN Charter, appears to be a significant indicator of reliability for long-term cooperation, including in digital integration.

Belarus' diplomatic predictability reinforces its viability as an integration partner. The Eurasian charter of diversity and multipolarity in the 21st century, which Belarus is promoting, merits attention. Minister of foreign affairs M. V. Ryzhenkov has argued that this Charter aims to establish a pan-continental security architecture, fostering regional stability and contribu-

ting to a multipolar global system capable of addressing complex planetary challenges [11].

President of the Republic of Belarus expressed this idea more broadly at the SCO summit in Astana in July 2024, stating that genuine and indivisible global security must be built in the 21st century, with initiative coming from countries of the global majority²⁶.

By positioning itself within this framework, Belarus cultivates the diplomatic trust required for long-term cooperation with primary technological providers.

While these geopolitical considerations may appear tangential to technological research, they are central to modern statecraft. As traditional instruments of soft power evolve, AI is emerging as an important vector of geopolitical influence, conceptualised by scholars as soft power 3.0 [12].

In his inaugural address, the 47th D. Trump, promised to «put America first» and initiated a large-scale political, economic, and ideological audit²⁷. Among the first bodies affected was the United States Agency for International Development. This raises questions about whether soft power, whereby a state attracts others through culture, values, and political institutions, has become obsolete. More precisely, one might ask whether the United States and other major powers are prepared to abandon attempts to spread their influence. More likely, contemporary soft power is undergoing a process of transformation, with a qualitative change in its instruments, particularly AI.

As this research demonstrates, despite AI's potential as a valuable resource, a broad spectrum of associated threats exists.

The deeper source of these concerns lies in the long historical experience of civilisation. Human beings have not only constantly sought and introduced new tools, but have also repeatedly turned inventions into weapons. It is impossible to know in advance how an intelligence more powerful than our own would act, only assumptions can be made.

Conclusions

The principal risks arising from the rapid deployment of AI in the absence of effective international regulatory frameworks may be grouped into three broad categories.

Military risks. Pronounced asymmetries in states' technological capabilities, combined with the growing use of AI in ongoing armed conflicts, require a reconsideration of how global digital transformation is reshaping sovereignty and security. These developments

also strengthen the case for strict human control over critical military command-and-control systems. In the EAEU context, this implies a need for coordinated legislative and regulatory approaches that preserve national interests within a common digital space.

Economic risks. If EAEU member states remain passive in international competition over AI, they risk not only a decline in technological competitiveness but also

²⁴Belarus ratified the treaty with Russia on security guarantees // President of the Republic of Belarus : website. URL: <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/belarus-ratificirovala-dogovor-s-rossiej-o-garantiah-bezopasnosti> (date of access: 04.04.2026) (in Russ.).

²⁵How a parade was held in Beijing to mark the 80th anniversary of Victory in World War II // TASS. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24925065> (date of access: 05.04.2026) (in Russ.).

²⁶Participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Council of heads of states meeting in Astana // President of the Republic of Belarus : website. URL: <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/ucastie-v-sammite-sanhajskoj-organizacii-sotrudnicstva> (date of access: 11.04.2026) (in Russ.).

²⁷The inaugural address // The White House : website. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/01/the-inaugural-address/> (date of access: 11.04.2026).

substantial long-term economic losses. Failure to respond to major technological trends would effectively push the economies of the Union State and the EAEU towards the periphery of global capital flows. At the same time, uneven digital development within the EAEU may generate relations of dependency, whereby less technologically advanced member states become reliant on AI platforms developed by the union's leading economies. Such asymmetries would hinder the emergence of a unified digital market and obstruct the realisation of integration synergies, which depend on a more balanced distribution of relevant capabilities across the integration space. In addition, rapid automation and the replacement of human labour by AI systems in key sectors such as transport, logistics, and services may lead to large-scale labour displacement for which the union's labour markets are not yet institutionally or economically prepared.

Humanitarian and societal risks. New technologies may exclude significant social groups from participation in the production of goods and services, thereby intensifying existing debates over rights and freedoms in contemporary society. A further risk lies in a potential crisis of trust in digital institutions: algorithmic bias in AI-assisted governmental and administrative decision-making may result in hidden discrimination, violations of fundamental rights, and increased social tension within the integration grouping. Of particular concern is the possibility that external actors may use AI-enabled tools, including generative models, deep-fakes, and recommender systems, to manipulate public opinion and conduct disruptive information operations in the media environments of the EAEU and the Union State, thereby undermining humanitarian security and sovereignty. Finally, the allocation of legal responsibility remains unresolved, particularly with regard to who should bear liability when an algorithmic error causes harm to a citizen's health or property.

In light of these challenges, the Republic of Belarus, together with its EAEU partners and within the framework of the Union State, should intensify efforts both to develop relevant technologies and to establish common approaches to their deployment and legal regulation. Such measures would make it possible to use AI's economic potential more effectively while strengthening the protection of national sovereignty.

The key directions of digital integration may be outlined as follows.

Interaction within the EAEU. A concept «digital union» should be adopted to align the best technological solutions available across member states while preserving the digital sovereignty of each of them. The accelerated harmonisation of national approaches could be supported through the creation of a Eurasian technological core built on existing systems and models, including those already functioning in the Russia.

Interaction within the Union State. For Belarus, digital integration with Russia appears to be a practical necessity, given the institutional, economic, and political interdependence established within the Union State framework. Belarus should not be viewed solely as a recipient of technology. Its scientific base, modern industrial capacity, and substantial energy resources suitable for the location and operation of data centres could support joint programmes. In this context, it would be advisable to establish an intergovernmental commission responsible for overseeing deep digital integration between Belarus and Russia, including workforce development, AI deployment, and the legal regulation of the resulting relations.

Given the pace of AI development, it is important not only to identify the risks involved but also to recognise its constructive potential. The speed and depth of AI diffusion across social and economic life are increasingly compelling the international community to seek an appropriate trajectory for contemporary scientific and technological development.

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