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ПОЭТИЗАЦИЯ ПРИРОДЫ И МЫШЛЕНИЯ: КОМПАРАТИВНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ПРОЕКТОВ М. ХАЙДЕГГЕРА И Р. У. ЭМЕРСОНА

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Научные исследования отношений М. Хайдеггера и Р. У. Эмерсона проводятся редко (исключение – работы С. Кэвелла). Учитывая влияние Р. У. Эмерсона на Ф. Ницше и значительное влияние, которое последний оказал на М. Хайдеггера, можно задаться вопросом о необходимости установления какой-либо взаимосвязи между творчеством мыслителей. В исследовании подтверждается наличие этой взаимосвязи с помощью тезиса, что природа играет важную роль в трудах как М. Хайдеггера, так и Р. У. Эмерсона. Оба мыслителя показывают, что в поэтизации природы творец не делает утверждений как таковых. Эта особенность характерна для творчества М. Хайдеггера и Р. У. Эмерсона. Однако в исследовании показано, что в трудах М. Хайдеггера и Р. У. Эмерсона прослеживаются разногласия по вопросу отношения поэзии к мысли.

Ключевые слова: М. Хайдеггер; Р. У. Эмерсон; С. Кэвелл; природа; воспитание; необъективация; отречение; метафизика.

POETISATION OF NATURE AND THINKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECTS OF M. HEIDEGGER AND R. W. EMERSON

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Scholarship of Martin M. Heidegger's relation to R. W. Emerson is seldom conducted, notwithstanding limited engagement on the part of S. Cavell. Considering the influence R. W. Emerson had on F. Nietzsche, and the significant influence the latter had on M. Heidegger, any necessary relation needs to be studied. The author of this paper confirms this relatability in the role that nature plays in the writings of both M. Heidegger and R. W. Emerson. Both thinkers show that in the poetising of nature,

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the poet is not making assertions as such, rather imparting upon receiving from nature as that which «educates». The author reveals this feature to be central to the poet figure of both M. Heidegger and R. W. Emerson, and both agree that it is exhibited by few remarkable figures throughout history. However, the limit of their congruency, as the author argues, is in M. Heidegger and R. W. Emerson's disagreement regarding the relation of poetry to thought.

Keywords: M. Heidegger; R. W. Emerson; S. Cavell; nature; education; nonobjectification; renunciation; metaphysics.

Introduction

Nature historically tends to be of sacred importance to both the poets and philosophers alike, regardless of whether this is the cosmic nature of the Stoics or the mystical nature of W. Whitman [1]. In M. Heidegger, nature is of no less significance, especially depicted in his seminal lectures on F. Hölderlin during the 1930s. M. Heidegger's writings on nature have more to do with its more «originary» form in contrast to what he sees in its conceptualising by metaphysics. As such, the nature that M. Heidegger is searching for is ostensibly free from the metaphysical heritage of the Ancient Greeks, a pursuit of its unadulterated form. M. Heidegger finds this to be attained in F. Hölderlin, with two fundamental features that are central to our investigation. The first, nature as that which «educates» which I show is a transformative enrapture. Secondly, the resulting poet's expression upon this transformation. This leads to M. Heidegger's exclusive focus on F. Hölderlin who exhibits the two aforementioned features. Moreover, this harks back to nature as free from any metaphysical predispositions, a view that M. Heidegger argues F. Hölderlin promulgates in his poetry.

In R. W. Emerson, we see significant parallels [2, p. 173]¹. R. W. Emerson affirms the poet's edu-

cative transformation in interplay with nature, determining nature's «naming» and «saying»². In contrast to M. Heidegger, however, R. W. Emerson does not see Plato's thought or influence as an impediment to the originary conception of nature. Rather, R. W. Emerson sees Plato as the philosopher-poet who proffers the divine nature beyond lyrical form (CE, p. 473). This contrasted reading of Plato amounts to M. Heidegger's distinction between poetry and philosophy, whereas R. W. Emerson sees them as part of a harmonious whole, the amalgamation of beauty and truth. Despite this fundamental difference, I will show that both thinkers do reach a synonymous conclusion. Moreover, some effort towards the end of the paper is made to show that M. Heidegger in «Was heißt Denken?» may have altered his point of view regarding Plato's dialogues *apropos* the polarisation of poetry and philosophy. Further detailed investigation of M. Heidegger's view on this polarisation is the subject matter of another paper, however, sufficient engagement has been made here to further illustrate the divergence between M. Heidegger and R. W. Emerson regarding poetry, philosophy and the role that nature plays for both.

The securing of nature

M. Heidegger sees the fundamental word of Occidental thought in φύσις (*physis*), a word that in its translation as *natura* has lost its original meaning and acquired something «alien» (GA 4, p. 79)³. Instead, it is the «futural» F. Hölderlin that poetises the recovery of nature as the «all powerful», that which mastery and teaching cannot but «inculcate» (*beibringen*), for it is nature that «educates» (*erziehen*)⁴ (GA 4, p. 75). M. Heidegger spills considerable ink on F. Hölderlin's

futural poetising throughout the 1930s which to cover in detail is not possible here, although certain features relevant to our investigations need to be recognised⁵. According to M. Heidegger, F. Hölderlin exercises his uniqueness as a poet in his being a student, recipient and messenger of the «wonderfully all-present» nature. There is no imposition on nature here, but a deliverance upon receiving from nature as that which delivers. In other words, F. Hölderlin is not merely «recovering» the

¹As S. Cavell notes, «similarity of Emerson with Heidegger can be seen as mediated by Nietzsche» [2, p. 173]. Similarities that include R. W. Emerson's «finding as founding» being commensurate with M. Heidegger's «state of mind in the "Befindlichkeit"» [3, p. XVII].

²«It publishes itself in creatures, reaching from particles and spiculae through transformation on transformation to the highest symmetries, arriving at consummate results without a shock or a leap» (CE, p. 412). Citation for R. W. Emerson's works include abbreviation, followed by page number.

³Citation for M. Heidegger's works includes abbreviation, followed by page number.

⁴M. Heidegger uses F. Hölderlin's term *erzhiehet*, which can also mean formation or development not just education. M. Heidegger elsewhere explains that this teaching is «grounded in a relational being drawn into the origin» (GA 39, p. 232). Adding to this, A. Gethmann-Siefert writes that F. Hölderlin had drafted an «ideal for the education of a people» (*Ideal der Volkerziehung*) which he intended on achieving via his poetry. So F. Hölderlin's intention to propagate his transformative interplay with nature as «education» may have influenced M. Heidegger's reading [4, p. 248].

⁵«Hölderlin is the most futural because he approaches from the longest distance and in this distance traverses and transforms what is greatest» (GA 65, p. 318).

Ancient Greek φύσις but liberating it for the future. In this way, F. Hölderlin stands outside of the metaphysical tradition in his understanding of «beyng»⁶ [5, p. 77]. To detail this, we turn to M. Heidegger's treatment of F. Hölderlin's poetising that reveals nature as the «captivating and enrapturing» teacher, and F. Hölderlin as the captivated and enraptured student of nature.

F. Hölderlin reveals the «wonderfully all-present» nature through «human work and in the destiny of peoples, in the stars and in the gods, but also in stones, growing things, and animal» (GA 4, p. 75). M. Heidegger is adamant, however, that nature's omnipresence is not objectifiable as a «thing», but only reveals itself in its beauty and omnipresence, and as such, «escapes explanation on the basis of what is real» (GA 4, p. 75). Nature is recognisable in its revealing of divine beauty, hence F. Hölderlin's referral to the blooming of flowers, the flow of the river and the sound of the rustling leaves. Nature then is the pre-metaphysical – the *a priori* of that which is revealed, not the type that «calculates and plans» (GA 52, p. 35). This is evident in its beauty receding upon itself in any attempts at objectification, for this all-present beauty cannot be denigrated to «calculation», a word that M. Heidegger often uses to characterise modernity⁷. In «Besinnung», M. Heidegger explains that nature in modernity is transformed into «installations», and in «...installations and according to their style, nature becomes "beautiful"... Beauty is what pleases and must please the being of the power of man, the predator» (GA 66, p. 23). The power of man in M. Heidegger's view is that which is modelled according to man's preconceived «installations» of what is beautiful. Nature, however, is neither what appears beautiful, nor is it defined by the aesthetic characteristics that F. Hölderlin is portraying in his poetry. So, within modernity, nature is not free to reveal itself in its beauty, it appears in favour of «basic determination», which is nothing but «sheer machination» (GA 66, p. 23). F. Hölderlin's revealing of nature is immune to such calculation: *Whom no master alone, whom she, wonderfully / All-present, educates in a light embrace, / The powerful, divinely beautiful nature* (GA 4, p. 75).

F. Hölderlin's transformative education in a «light embrace» is demonstration of his being the recipient of nature's revealing⁸. The «no master alone» (*die kein Meister allein*) determines the lack of preceding installations or conceptualisations. If we delve a little deeper, nature captivates and enraptures in its «all embracing» beauty, a transformation that the poet alone can endure without falling prey to the qualms of calculation and objective thinking: *For she [nature], she herself, more ancient than the times / And beyond the gods of Occident and Orient* (GA 39, p. 231).

For M. Heidegger, when F. Hölderlin poetises something the beyond the gods and the more ancient than the times, he founds the «fundamental event of beyng» which is nothing other than the «clang of arms of nature herself, beyng that brings itself to itself in the word» (GA 39, p. 233). The fundamental event of beyng is what allows for the poetising of nature, even before the Greek φύσις. This leads us to ask, why is F. Hölderlin alone the poet that endures? It is not a coincidence that M. Heidegger's «turn» (*Kehre*) of the 1930s is consistent with his lectures on F. Hölderlin⁹. M. Heidegger is attempting to overcome Occidental metaphysics as the sway of the «machine», and its securing of nature (GA 66, p. 151). The notion of «overcoming» is the subject matter of his essay «Überwindung der Metaphysik» was composed in 1936–1946 (GA 7, p. 84–110). It is important to briefly comment M. Heidegger's thoughts here to make clear his view of F. Hölderlin's overcoming metaphysics. Here M. Heidegger writes that metaphysics neither can «be abolished like an opinion», nor does overcoming it «mean thrusting aside a discipline from the field of philosophical "education"» (GA 7, p. 85). Instead, «the overcoming of metaphysics occurs as the incorporation of Being», and overcoming itself «is worthy of thought only when we think about incorporation»¹⁰ (GA 7, p. 85, 91). F. Hölderlin, therefore, is allowing nature to reveal itself with impunity from metaphysics in incorporation (*Verwindung*). This entails an appropriation of Greek «Metaphysics» as the «truth of beings» (and its understanding of nature): «...a still hidden but distinctive appropriating, namely the oblivion of Being» (GA 7, p. 85).

⁶For the «saying of the poetising arises from beyng» (GA 39, p. 232). In a 1949 note added to the original 1930s text «On the essence of truth», M. Heidegger discusses the archaic spelling of beyng and explains that «beyng is thought as the difference that holds sway between Being and beings» (GA 9, p. 153).

⁷From this we can see why M. Heidegger focuses on Heraclitus' fragment «Nature loves to hide». M. Heidegger's translation is following: «Emerging to self-concealing gives favour» (*Das Aufgehen dem Sichverbergen schenkt's die Gunst*). This is incumbent upon M. Heidegger's understanding of φύσις as the perpetual emerging (GA 55, p. 123). C. Kahn proposes alternative translation: «The true character of a thing likes to be in hiding» [6, p. 33].

⁸It is worth relating this to M. Heidegger's «Problem of a nonobjectifying thinking and speaking in today's theology» (1964), added to his 1928 essay «Phenomenology and theology». M. Heidegger here explains taking delight in a blossoming rose that make neither «an object of the rose, nor do we even make it something standing over against us». This is precisely what M. Heidegger sees F. Hölderlin poetising (GA 9, p. 58).

⁹For a good collection of essays on M. Heidegger's turn, see [7].

¹⁰For the translation of German «Überwindung der Metaphysik als Verwindung des Seins sich ereignet» the word «incorporation» was chosen for the German «Verwindung», which can also mean a joining or bonding in this context.

Appropriation in the futural poetising of F. Hölderlin

To answer the question raised before F. Hölderlin's renunciation (*Verzichten*) of the gods of old is the answer, as M. Heidegger describes in «Germanien» (GA 39, p. 74–76). F. Hölderlin here is neither rejecting nor affirming the divinity of the Ancient Greek gods. He is appropriating the divine which is more ancient than the times and beyond the gods – per the fundamental attunement of «holy mourning» in renunciation, «a calling in which we await that which is called as such»¹¹ (GA 39, p. 74). F. Hölderlin is essentially «renouncing» the Greek heritage whilst preserving the divinity of nature through poetry. He is the recipient of nature and must preserve this poetising without imposition, hence M. Heidegger's referral to F. Hölderlin's futural thinking and saying¹². To elaborate further, in the lectures «Der Rhein» M. Heidegger writes that the «beyng of the poet is grounded in "nature" (beyng as such), which says itself originarily in the poetising» (GA 39, p. 234). Here, the poet must «inhabit and sustain the middle of beyng between gods and humans» (GA 39, p. 234) to poetise nature without conceptualising it, effectively preserving it for the future. In the later volume «Zu Hölderlin», M. Heidegger goes further with this, explaining that this is an enlivening or stimulation (*Ermunterung*) that emerges from the nature of the Greek φύσις but is even more originary. Essentially this is the fundamental relation of nature to the «soul», and hence why the *Ermunterung* is instigated regardless of the age of the poet's inhabitancy¹³ (GA 75, S. 294).

Furthermore, in «Das Ereignis», M. Heidegger questions whether this makes F. Hölderlin's poetry subservient to a more refined form of interpretation, a literary-historiological or philosophical explications (GA 71, p. 290–296). Is poetry and perhaps more specifically, F. Hölderlin's futural poetry the interpretative tool to excavate that which is most originary in nature? M. Heidegger here is adamant that this interpretation is neither historical interpretation, nor revitalisation of poetry. The saying of F. Hölderlin cannot be assimilated with those of Pindar for example, for «both speak out of a saying which is not an asser-

ting» (GA 71, p. 292). Here we get a profound insight into what F. Hölderlin is putting into the saying, namely, nature *apropos* beyng. This grants it a certain degree of immunity from being reproduced in a different historical epoch, language or expressive style, much like we see in the writings of Homer, which M. Heidegger gives as an example in the fifth of his Bremen lectures: «Talk and talking do not mean speaking and speech in the sense of an uttering of expressions; talk means precisely that which from early on λέγειν, λόγος means: bringing before, bringing collectively to appearance. The most beautiful testament for this sense of talk and λόγος is at the same time the oldest, which the tradition keeps ready for us. It is found in Homer's *Odyssey*, first book, verse 56» (GA 79, p. 151).

This is evidenced in F. Hölderlin's fundamental attunement of holy mourning that appropriates this fundamental Greek relation between nature and the human being, particularly in the manic inspiration – μανία seen in Plato and others without the Hellenic or metaphysical elements¹⁴. After all, the Homeric gods are no longer, and both F. Hölderlin and M. Heidegger inhabit the age of the Abrahamic God but nonetheless remain inextricably bound to the history of beyng.

It is important to recognise, therefore, that M. Heidegger's notion of appropriation (*Ereignis*) is concomitant with his picture of F. Hölderlin's renunciation¹⁵. A product of M. Heidegger's thinking of the 1930s, where «plant, animal, stone, sea, and sky come to be without descending into objectivity»¹⁶ (GA 65, p. 231). F. Hölderlin's poetising of nature is the renunciation-Event, that allows the flower to bloom in its «nonsensuous meaning» (*das Nichtsinnliche*)¹⁷ (GA 53, p. 16–18). The Greeks certainly poetised nature, but their inevitable culmination in Plato's metaphysics is overcome in F. Hölderlin's poetry. F. Hölderlin remains faithful to the Event as it discloses and thereby allows for an alternative saying with impunity from assertion and calculation [12]. Again, this is demonstrative of F. Hölderlin's unique placement in the middle of the Event, the clearing (*Lichtung*) that determines this unrestricted

¹¹C. Bambach calls this sacred morning, the stand in between the concealment and revelation, hiddenness and unhiddenness of the truth of the earth [8, p. 156].

¹²A. Gethmann-Siefert explains that M. Heidegger «transplants Hölderlin's poetry into a situation in which the difference the ancient and the modern which was codiagnosed by the poet himself does not arise» [4, p. 156].

¹³M. Heidegger usually refrains from using the word «soul», it is interesting that this surfaces here in this volume «Ermunternde ist die» Natur «schon auf die Seele des Menschen bezogen».

¹⁴As Plato in the «Ion» describes, «it's not by mastery that they make poems or say many lovely things about their subjects (as you do about Homer) – but because it's by a divine gift». See [9]. This is widespread throughout in the Ancient Greek world, for instance in Heraclitus: «The Sibyl with raving mouth utters things mirthless and unadorned and unperfumed, and her voice carries through a thousand years because of the god who speaks through her» [6, p. 45, 124]. Ancient Greek μανία is defined as synonymous with inspiration or prophecy as opposed to a mental illness or cognitive derangement [10, p. 611–617].

¹⁵*Ereignis* has now recently been translated as «adaptation» in the recently released M. Heidegger lexicon [11, p. 19–30].

¹⁶For the other texts in the series, see (GA 66; GA 67; GA 69; GA 70; GA 71). The volume 72 «Die Stege des Anfangs (Pathways of the Beginning)» (1944) is yet to be published at the time of this paper. As W. H. McNeill explains, F. Hölderlin's poetising, «first makes possible language» [8, p. 177].

¹⁷C. Bambach explains that F. Hölderlin «is less the name of a poet for M. Heidegger than it is the name for a way of rethinking in a deeply originary way the meaning and sense of the whole Western tradition» [8, p. 151].

view in his non-objectifying poetising of nature¹⁸ (GA 75, S. 283). Because F. Hölderlin poetises this opening, he found historical time and the futural essence of thinking [8, p. 188]. This event is «history proper», akin to the Greek «festival» as the reciprocal encounter of the gods and humans (GA 52, p. 68). Here, the beauty of nature in the celebratory event is revealed free from

conceptualisation and wherein lies the saying of F. Hölderlin's futural appropriative poetising, just it had well over two millennia before in Homer. Freedom from concepts is the essence of poetising, or what M. Heidegger would call in «Das Geschichte des Seyns» as «essential thinking», «image-less poetising in the word of the saga of beyng»¹⁹ (GA 69, p. 139).

R. W. Emerson's nature

The objectification of nature that concerns M. Heidegger is described by R. W. Emerson as the classification of nature where everything is individual, stands by itself²⁰. A consequence of this segregation from nature results in the scholar's failure to account for nature's receding into itself in its boundlessness. As J. Moore explains the Emersonian scholar, must «be partly educated and swayed by converse with nature, though nature has to divide the honors with books»²¹ [14, p. 187]. R. W. Emerson in the 1837 Cambridge address «American scholar» denounces the scholar who serves a function within society as a «delegated intellect», whom he calls «man thinking», a «parrot of other men's thinking»²² (CW, p. 1098). In remaining constricted to the books of past thinkers and the libraries, the scholar becomes the victim of society. All the while, the «winds blow; ever the grass grows», which the scholar neglects instead of standing «wistful and admiring before this great spectacle» (CW, p. 1099). For nature is what the scholar needs, that which «resembles his own spirit, whose beginning, whose ending, he can never find, – so entire, so boundless», since nature «hastens to render account of herself» (CW, p. 1099). Therefore, nature must also educate, although, hitherto, the relation to M. Heidegger's transformative education (*erziehen*) remains unsettled.

In the essay «Intellect», R. W. Emerson elaborates on this education as the «marriage of thought with nature», with «thought» being a revelation, a «conversion of all nature into the rhetoric of thought» (CE, p. 297–298). S. Cavell explains this as the «reverse» of a thinking-self for creation, «it is the exercise not of power but of reception» which parallels M. Heidegger's thinking «on the

way» [2, p. 174]. R. W. Emerson describes reception as follows: «All I know is reception; I am and I have: but I do not get, and when I have fancied I had gotten anything, I found I did not» [CE, p. 363]. For R. W. Emerson, not all are capable of this, as there is a natural inequality, where at the zenith stands the «inexhaustible poet» who could «break through the silence into adequate rhyme», for it is the poet «whom Nature cannot deceive»²³. In essay «The poet», however, R. W. Emerson explains that all human beings can sense the «supersensual utility» in the beauty of the stars, earth and water, but there remains a «phlegm in our constitution» that prevents them «to yield the due effect»²⁴. Despite our capacity to perceive the beauty of nature, enduring the transformation required to reproduce its beauty is beyond the capacity of most. Even so, the poet «...is the person in whom these powers are in balance, the man without impediment, who sees and handles that which others dream of, traverses the whole scale of experience and is representative of man, in virtue of being the largest power to receive and to impart... The poet is the sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is a sovereign, and stands on the centre... and if any poet has witnessed the transformation he doubtless found it in harmony with various experiences. We have all seen changes as considerable in wheat and caterpillars. He is the poet and shall draw us with love and terror, who sees through the flowing vest the firm nature, and can declare it» (CE, p. 321).

Evidently then, R. W. Emerson's account of the poet is indistinguishable from M. Heidegger's F. Hölderlin²⁵. M. Heidegger's ascribing the transformative power of nature exclusively to F. Hölderlin when

¹⁸As W. H. McNeil explains, this is clearing not ontic nor ontological, «but opening the time-space of the difference itself» [8, p. 190].

¹⁹Also see M. Heidegger's determination of «essential thinking» in the later volume «Das Ereignis» (GA 71, p. 269). Here essential thinking is what the thinker understands as that which can never attain a result, or become «measurable by effectivity», although it is effective on readers and hearers in a way that «effects a clarification, recasting, and steering of an epoch and often does so against its own aims» (GA 71, p. 269).

²⁰S. Cavell relates this R. W. Emerson's insight with M. Heidegger: «Emerson's imaging of clutching and M. Heidegger's of grasping emblematised their interpretation of Western conceptualising as a kind of sublimised violence» [13, p. 136–137].

²¹This is not unlike F. Hölderlin's poetic dwelling that M. Heidegger describes (GA 39, p. 34).

²²As R. W. Emerson describes in «Self-reliance», «the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato and Milton is that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men, but what they thought» (CW, p. 145).

²³R. W. Emerson calls this «consanguinity» (CE, p. 298–300). As J. Urbans explains, R. W. Emerson's poet «can read the flowing forms», and «detect essential resemblances in natures never before compared» [15, p. 2–3].

²⁴«Too feeble fall the impressions of nature on us to make us artists» (CE, p. 321).

²⁵It is in reading R. W. Emerson that S. Cavell finds a way to M. Heidegger, as he explains that M. Heidegger's indebtedness to F. Hölderlin is mirrored by R. W. Emerson and H. Thoreau's interest in poetry [2, p. 173–174]. Also, S. Cavell explains that R. W. Emerson and M. Heidegger's «thinking as being drawn as on a path», is consistent with Wittgenstein's the «proof is not a movement but a route» [16, p. 17].

read in light of R. W. Emerson's insights, is, therefore, problematic. Both see the poet's «centre» symbolising the transformation needed to non-objec-

tively propagate nature, the discordance, however, amounts to M. Heidegger's reading of the history of metaphysics²⁶.

The philosopher-poet

M. Heidegger's turn to F. Hölderlin is motivated by his reading of the history of metaphysics, what he calls the «forgottenness of being», (*die Seinsvergessenheit*) and the breakdown of truth²⁷. Central to this reading is M. Heidegger's characterisation of Plato and his responsibility for the inception of the correctness of the gaze and *ιδέα* per his cave allegory²⁸. M. Heidegger's point here is clear, the poetry of F. Hölderlin represents the move towards the overcoming of the metaphysical thinking that starts with Plato. R. W. Emerson affirms the Platonic influence: «How many great men Nature is incessantly sending up out of night, to be *his men-Platonists!*» (CE, p. 471). But disparately, he sees Plato as the philosopher-poet *per excellentiam* (CE, p. 471). The Emersonian marriage of thought and nature is exhibited definitively in Plato's metaphysics, what he calls in his 1845–1846 essay on Plato the «wonderful synthesis», one which every great artist has²⁹ (CE, p. 479). For R. W. Emerson, Plato is the poet *qua* philosopher who metaphysically-poetises per boundless nature³⁰. Pla-

to herein is the sovereign who stands on the 'centre' of thought and nature in perfect harmony: *Plato is clothed with the powers of a poet, / stands upon the highest place of the poet, and / (though I doubt he wanted the decisive gift of / lyric expression), mainly is not a poet because he chose to use the poetic gift to an ulterior purpose* (CE, p. 473).

The apex of expression for R. W. Emerson, therefore, is the ability to receive and impart from nature the poetic interdependently with metaphysical-philosophical thought – there is no dissociation here. While M. Heidegger sees Platonic metaphysics as responsible for the inauguration of the exclusivity to conceptual thinking, R. W. Emerson instead implicates man thinking. Furthermore, R. W. Emerson sees the impossibility of speaking and thinking without embracing the «difference of things», and «oneness and otherness»³¹ (CE, p. 475). The poet hereby is not distinct from the philosopher, as R. W. Emerson does not problematise metaphysics as M. Heidegger does. So, the futural thinker that M. Heidegger finds in F. Hölderlin, R. W. Emerson saw in Plato, among others³².

Poetising or thinking?

In M. Heidegger, we do see a somewhat peripheral albeit renewed reference to Plato. In «Was heißt Denken?» M. Heidegger reconsiders the possibility of the simultaneity of philosophical-poetising, one that is characterised by a response to a call like the «thinking as reception» in R. W. Emerson [2, p. 171–172]. While generally, M. Heidegger affirms the separation between thinking

and poetising, in this later work he does concede that there are times «when they are the same – those times when the gulf separating poesy and thinking is a clean and decisive cleft» (GA 8, p. 8). This occurs when «poesy is lofty, and thinking profound», a matter that M. Heidegger claims, F. Hölderlin understood well³³ (GA 8, p. 20). Furthermore, it is interesting that M. Heidegger would

²⁶R. W. Emerson and M. Heidegger here may be potentially influenced by Plato's Diotima figure in the «Symposium», and her explication of the spirit of love being in «between» the mortals and immortals, men and gods, and through «them all, divination passes». See [9, p. 486].

²⁷This is determined by his «first beginning» in the pre-Socratics and Plato, and the need for an «other beginning» in F. Hölderlin. M. Heidegger details this in (GA 65, p. 93–95).

²⁸This would be beyond the scope of this paper to cover, however, I refer to M. Heidegger's seminal texts in which these themes are developed in detail «Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit» (GA 9) and «Vom Wesen Der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet» (GA 34).

²⁹P. Schirmer explains R. W. Emerson's depiction of Plato's artistry as a tension between poetry and philosophical reflexivity resulting in a «poetic creativeness» or «traditional surface» [17, p. 9–10].

³⁰J. Urbas calls this «bipolarity» and contrasts this with the anti-metaphysical reading of R. W. Emerson in S. Cavell, and one would assume by criticism of the anti-metaphysical correlation that this would include a criticism of M. Heidegger [15, p. 33–35]. J. Urbas characterises S. Cavell's reading of R. W. Emerson more generally as «wanting in rigor and fidelity» [18, p. 557]. Other scholars have also raised similar concerns, such as J. Porte who characterises S. Cavell's reading of R. W. Emerson as a «very un-Emersonian discipleship» that gets R. W. Emerson «quite wrong – in both small and big ways» [19, p. 460].

³¹In M. Heidegger's «Grundsätze des Denken», he questions whether thinking itself is subject to the positing of principles, in this case, the principle of non-contradiction. Whereas R. W. Emerson sees the impossibility of avoiding this, M. Heidegger sees the origin of thinking and its principles as remaining in the dark, and potentially always participatory in all thinking essentially. This is perhaps why M. Heidegger sees the futility of metaphysics, and by default, Plato's efforts, see (GA 79, p. 77–166).

³²R. W. Emerson also names major poets such as J. Milton, J. Woodsworth but also thinkers such as Plotinus and Pythagoras to whom nature may speak, «and that her favourite may make acquaintance with those divine strengths which disclose themselves to serious and abstracted thought» (CE, p. 730–731).

³³Upon observing M. Heidegger's reading F. Hölderlin's «Ister», S. Cavell notes that «M. Heidegger's text would not exist without F. Hölderlin's» [20, p. 115]. If this is the case, then perhaps this gives credence to why M. Heidegger sees thought as distinct from poetising, or even stimulated by it.

use F. Hölderlin's text «Socrates and Alcibiades» to further illustrate this cleft (*Kluft*) – focusing on the words «thought and «love» that stand in the «closest vicinity» (GA 8, p. 20). On that note, I can speculate, perhaps somewhat apprehensively, that the later M. Heidegger may be rethinking his earlier thoughts on Plato, particularly if we look at his reference to the dialogue «Phaedrus». M. Heidegger is essentially stressing that Plato's dialogue being open to a multitude of interpretations is «the element in which all thought must move in order to be strict thought» (GA 8, p. 71). But what characterises the «strictness» of thought?

M. Heidegger hints that it is the «inexhaustibility» (*unausschöpfbar*) of Plato's dialogue «by its nature», which forever marks the creativeness which «of course, comes only to those who are capable of reverence» (*die verehren können*) (GA 8, p. 72). Again, *verehren* can also mean veneration, a profound resemblance to R. W. Emerson's «inexhaustible poet». While this may detract from our specific concerns on the relatability of thought to poetry, it nevertheless shows that perhaps from the 1950s onwards M. Heidegger may have had a different outlook on their consubstantiality, *vis-a-vis* the nature of Plato's thought. Moreover, in «Das Ereignis» the relation between poetising and thinking are discussed in detail, with which we have no room for an extensive engagement (GA 71, p. 239–289). To draw out an important detail, however, M. Heidegger here asserts that both poetry and philosophy are not fixed domains but are grounded in poetising and thinking. In this grounding, poetising is seen as the «naming» whilst thinking is the «seeking» of this saying (GA 71, p. 285–286). But it becomes clear the further one reads into this work that there is, in appearance at least, a distinction between the two, which for M. Heidegger is derived from metaphysics' limitations. The issue for M. Heidegger is that thinking their consubstantiality is «unsuited» for

metaphysics, a point R. W. Emerson would undoubtedly problematise.

R. W. Emerson, is certainly more consistent on their inextricability, bringing the centrality of nature's role into clear view³⁴. In his seminal work «Nature», R. W. Emerson explains that few «adult persons can see nature», and most «persons do not see the sun». The poet, however, can «integrate all parts», and his «intercourse with heaven and earth becomes part of his daily food» (CE, p. 5–6). Crucially, this «intercourse» must include thought conterminously with poetising, for a distinction between the two may risk nature's objectification. Any difference between thought and poetry only symbolises the unity of the truth of the philosopher and the beauty of the poet: «The true philosopher and the true poet are one, and a beauty, which is truth, and a truth which is beauty, is the aim of both. Is not the charm of one of Plato's or Aristotle's definitions strictly like that of the Antigone of Sophocles?» (CE, p. 30–31).

This insight is consistent with F. Hölderlin's enrap-ture, however, whereas M. Heidegger focuses solely on F. Hölderlin's poetry, R. W. Emerson's poetry is inextricably bound to thinking, hence the differing views on Plato³⁵. Therein lies the crux of the dissonance, M. Heidegger's attempt to overcome the objectification of nature post the Platonic inception is assumed by R. W. Emerson utilising the very Platonic inception that M. Heidegger implicates as the central problem. Thinking as reception in the case of R. W. Emerson entails poetising and thinking concomitantly. Whilst M. Heidegger points to the shortcomings of metaphysical thought in itself, R. W. Emerson refers to the thinker's segregation from nature instead. The marriage of thought with nature is equally reproducible in thinking and poetising. Nature, therefore, is the source for poetising exclusively in M. Heidegger, whereas, for R. W. Emerson, this includes both thinking and poetising.

Conclusion

Perhaps what is most striking is the harmonious conclusion of both thinkers, despite their differing accounts of the belongingness of poetising and thinking. It is important to note that nature is central to R. W. Emerson's American transcendentalism, which also is influenced to some extent by English and German Romanticism. While M. Heidegger's thought in several ways exercises

affinities with the Emersonian strand of transcendentalism as argued, the Platonic influence on R. W. Emerson's transcendentalism would prove insurmountable for M. Heidegger. M. Heidegger's reading of the history of metaphysics exhibits the entire post-Aristotelian history of philosophy as bound to the framework of Plato's incipient metaphysics, with F. Nietzsche repre-

³⁴S. Cavell finds affinity in M. Heidegger's statement that «for questioning is the piety of thinking», with R. W. Emerson's «Always our thinking is a pious reception». According to S. Cavell the principal text of M. Heidegger's to further explore this relation between Emerson and M. Heidegger is «Was heißt Denken?» which he sees as the quarrel between philosophy and theology [2, p. 171–172]. G. L. Bruns explains that this is S. Cavell's «partial translation of M. Heidegger's «Gelassenheit», nonviolent thinking, letting-be (or as I prefer) letting-go» which parallels R. W. Emerson's pious reception [21, p. 622].

³⁵In the first of M. Heidegger's F. Nietzsche volumes, he discusses the unity of beauty and truth per Plato's «Phaedrus» in the chapter entitled «Plato's Phaedrus: beauty and truth in felicitous discordance». In this volume, M. Heidegger affirms that beauty and truth «are in essence related to the selfsame, to Being; they belong together in one» (GA 6.1, p. 198). Despite their belonging together, however, «they must diverge for man, they must separate from one another» (GA 6.1, p. 198). This is, again due to Plato's positing of Being as the nonsensuous. So, here we see another disparity between R. W. Emerson and M. Heidegger being based on the Platonic foundation concerning thinking and poetising.

senting the end of this trajectory despite his rejection of Platonism. R. W. Emerson offers a differing view. It is man thinking that represents the great divide between the thinker and nature. For R. W. Emerson, the solution lies in the revelatory conversion of nature into both thought and poetry. Moreover, Plato is not responsible for the objectification of nature, as evidenced in the poetic-philosophic and allegorical nature of his dialogues. Notwithstanding this dispute, both thinkers are critical of the objectification of nature. Nature for them is not merely to be enjoyed in its aesthetic qualities but to be recognised for its transformative potentiality.

By way of conclusion, an important point needs mentioning. M. Heidegger's «Beiträge» is often considered the crucial work signifying his so-called turn, an effort

at moving towards a more poetic expression. M. Heidegger's goal here is to overcome conceptualised thinking, a goal that would preoccupy his writings for most of the 1930s and well into the mid to late 1940s. R. W. Emerson on the other hand is considered a poet who philosophises and is known for his poetry and poetic prose writing style in his essays, perhaps demonstrating the interdependency of poetry with philosophy. With these points in mind, it is important to note that this paper serves as a mere brief survey of both thinkers and their relatability, perhaps opening the door to a more comprehensive study, moving beyond what S. Cavell started. In a somewhat reluctant remark, I do find both thinkers having more in common than not and, hereby, eagerly anticipate such opportunities.

The list of shorts

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