Process reliabilism and veritic effectiveness

Authors

  • Aleksey M. Kardash Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, 1 Surganava Street, 2 building, Minsk 220072, Belarus

Keywords:

epistemology, justification, Alvin Goldman, reliabilism, process reliabilism, historical reliabilism, indicator reliabilism, truth tracking theory
Supporting Agencies
This article was prepared with the partial financial support of the Belarusian Republican Foundation for Fundamental Research (grant No. G22МS-001).

Abstract

The article discusses the main ideas of Alvin Goldman’s process reliabilism and related epistemological theories. A conceptual distinction between epistemic reliability and veritic effectiveness is introduced as a more parsimonious alternative to traditional arguments against reliabilism. The main ideas of reliabilism are examined in light of the notion of veritic effectiveness.

Author Biography

  • Aleksey M. Kardash, Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, 1 Surganava Street, 2 building, Minsk 220072, Belarus

    postgraduate student at the department of theory of knowledge and methodology of science, Centre for Philosophical-Methodological and Interdisciplinary Research

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Published

2024-10-03

Issue

No. 3 (2024): Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology

Section

Epistemology

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How to Cite

[1]
Kardash, A.M. 2024. Process reliabilism and veritic effectiveness. Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology. 3 (Oct. 2024), 35–44.