An ecological approach to the study of cognitive biases as demonstrations of bounded rationality

Abstract

The evolution of concepts of bounded rationality is analysed. Heuristics and cognitive biases are defined. The view on cognitive biases from the perspective of cognitive and ecological approaches is considered. The substantive characteristics of the ecological rationality are comprehensively examined. Structures of environments, building blocks of heuristic strategies, adaptive toolbox and its functions are studied. Currently discovered heuristics are described. The adaptability of cognitive mechanisms to different decision-making environments is investigated. Directions for further research are outlined.

Author Biography

Konstantin V. Poznyak, Belarusian State University, 4 Niezaliežnasci Avenue, Minsk 220030, Belarus

postgraduate student at the department of social and organisational psychology, faculty of philosophy and social sciences

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Published
2022-01-27
Keywords: bounded rationality, heuristics, cognitive biases, ecological rationality, adaptive toolbox, decision-making
How to Cite
Poznyak, K. V. (2022). An ecological approach to the study of cognitive biases as demonstrations of bounded rationality. Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 92-99. Retrieved from https://journals.bsu.by/index.php/philosophy/article/view/3923