The problem of self-refutation: is consistent relativism possible?

  • Evgeny L. Terekhin Belarusian State University, 4 Niezaliezhnasci Avenue, Minsk 220030, Belarus

Abstract

The article explores the possibility of a consistent and philosophically promising relativism, primarily in the context of considering the main argument of its opponents and critics – accusations of self-refutation. The concept of radical relativism is interpreted as inconsistent with the basic foundations of classical epistemology. In the course of the study, a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the tradition of using the argument of self-refutation of relativism was carried out. Three possible options for relativism to avoid accusations of self-refutation are identified: to remain at the level of local relativism, to claim the status of a metatheory, to affirm the truth of relativism as relative. It is shown that epistemological relativism, being one of the forms of the so-called local relativism, still cannot a priori avoid accusations of self-refutation, and relativism’s claims to the status of a metatheory cannot be adequately substantiated. The adoption of the program of substantiation of the relative truth of the relativistic paradigm opens up a real prospect of overcoming the argument of the self-refutation of relativism, at least in the form that has been established in classical epistemology since Plato.

Author Biography

Evgeny L. Terekhin, Belarusian State University, 4 Niezaliezhnasci Avenue, Minsk 220030, Belarus

postgraduate student at the department of philosophy and methodology of science, faculty of philosophy and social sciences

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Published
2023-11-05
Keywords: relativism, radical relativism, epistemological relativism, global relativism, local relativism, epistemic justifications, self-refuting statements
How to Cite
Terekhin, E. L. (2023). The problem of self-refutation: is consistent relativism possible?. Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 26-32. Retrieved from https://journals.bsu.by/index.php/philosophy/article/view/5529
Issue
No 3 (2023): Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology
Section
Epistemology

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