Parfit’s non-identity problem

  • Hossein Khodadadi University of Manitoba, 66 Chancellors Circle, Winnipeg R3T 2N2, Canada

Abstract

One of the longstanding issues that haunted the minds of many philosophers is our responsibility toward future generations. D. Parfit put forward one of the philosophical arguments that real people cannot be held accountable for the harm caused by their actions. Future people, as long as they have a decent life, cannot complain about a possible catastrophic situation created by the society that lives now, because subject-subject debt relationship can only exist between certain and existing people. D. Parfit’s counterintuitive idea has been challenged by philosophers. In recent literature A. Wrigley sets out to provide a solution to the problem of nonidentity drawing on the D. Lewis’s metaphysics of modality. It is reasoned why the proposal of A. Wrigley cannot solve the problems about non-existent people advanced by D. Parfit.

Author Biography

Hossein Khodadadi, University of Manitoba, 66 Chancellors Circle, Winnipeg R3T 2N2, Canada

postgraduate student at the department of philosophy, faculty of philosophy

 

References

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Published
2024-01-26
Keywords: D. Parfit, D. Lewis, modality, identity, non-identity
How to Cite
Khodadadi, H. (2024). Parfit’s non-identity problem. Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 41-46. Retrieved from https://journals.bsu.by/index.php/philosophy/article/view/5837
Issue
No 1 (2024): Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology
Section
Social Philosophy

Copyright (c) 2024 Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology

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